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VERTICAL RESTRAINTS, EFFICIENCY, AND
THE REAL WORLD
JEAN WEGMAN BURNS*
In this Article, Professor Burns addresses the rise of economic efficiency in anti-
trust jurisprudence She argues that the theory is incomplete in that it fails to
address "noneconomic" concerns, such as dealerfairness. intraband competition,
and business ethics, which society wishes addressed. Societal concern, she argues
is evidenced by the rise of dealer fairness remedies outside the realm of antitrust
law. In addition, she argues that the public regards the economic efficiency the-
ory as out of touch with reality as evidenced by the vocal opposition of sophisti-
cated consumer groups to modern Chicago-School-influenced antitrust
jurisprudence. She concludes by voicing support for a more fact-specific antitrust
jurisprudence-a trend exemplified by the recent Eastman-Kodak decision-for
legislation returning antitrust to the pre-Chicago status quo ante and for the
retention of dealer remedies outside of antitrust as an outlet forfairness concerns.
INTRODUCTION
N light of the ascendancy of the economic efficiency approach in anti-
trust, vertical restraint law appears to be all but dead.I Led by the
Chicago School,2 economic efficiency advocates have been teaching, with
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School; J.D. 1973, University
of Chicago; B.A. 1970, Vanderbilt University.
1. Vertical restraint law in antitrust has been a fertile area for commentary. No
attempt will be made in this article to collect all the scholarship in this area. For exam-
ples of articles discussing vertical restraints, see William F. Baxter, The Viability of Verti-
cal Restraints Doctrine, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 933 (1987); Roger D. Blair & Gordon L Lang,
Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale Price Fixing Moves Toward the Rule of Reason,
44 Vand. L. Rev. 1007 (1991); Terry Calvani & Andrew G. Berg, Resale Price Mainte-
nance after Monsanto: A Doctrine Still at War with Itself, 1984 Duke L.J. 1163; William
S. Comanor, The Two Economics of Vertical Restraints, 21 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1265 (1992);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust L.J.
135 (1984); John J. Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints after Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 Cornell L. Rev. 1095 (1986); Victor P. Goldberg, The
Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions." A Relational Perspective, 58 Tex. L. Rev. 91
(1979); Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality: Vertical Price
Restraints Revisited, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 815 (1992); George A. Hay, Vertical Restraints
After Monsanto, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 418 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, Vertical Restric-
tions and Monopoly Power, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 521 (1984); Benjamin Klein & Kevin M.
Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & Econ. 265
(1988); Saul Levmore, Rescuing Some Antitrust Law: An Essay on Vertical Restrictions
and Consumer Information, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 981 (1982); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Genealogy
of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 Hastings L.J. 511 (1989); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Dis-
tributor Terminations Pursuant to Conspiracies Among a Supplier and Complaining Dis-
tributors: A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 297 (1982); James F.
Ponsoldt, The Enrichment of Sellers as a Justification for Vertical Restraints: A Response
to Chicago's Swiftian Modest Proposal, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1166 (1987); Richard A. Pos-
ner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality,
48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 6 (1981); Barbara A. White, Black and White Thinking in the Gray
Areas of Antitrust: The Dismantling of Vertical Restraints Regulation, 60 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1 (1991).
2. For a history of the Chicago School's antitrust analysis, see Richard A. Posner,
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increasing success in the courts, that most vertical restraints are benign,
if not beneficial, for consumers.' They assert that vertical restraints of
any sort-whether territorial restrictions, bans on discounting, or tie-
ins 4 -give consumers more product-mixes from which to choose in the
interbrand market.5 Concerns for dealer autonomy, fairness, or in-
trabrand competition, the argument goes, are "noneconomic" and not
legitimate parts of antitrust analysis. 6
Although critics of the Chicago School object to the dismissal of
"noneconomic" concerns7 (and some argue that these concerns are actu-
ally economically based),' the economic efficiency approach is, without a
doubt, seductive in its internal consistency and logic and has led to an
The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979). One of the
earliest statements of the economic efficiency approach to vertical restraints is Lester G.
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & Econ. 86 (1960).
3. The key aspects of the economic efficiency approach to vertical restraints are sum-
marized infra at notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
4. Vertical restraints in the form of pricing, territorial, or customer restraints differ
from tie-ins in that the latter not only restrict the buyer but also restrain the supplier's
competitors in the tied product market who can no longer sell to the buyer. See Posner,
supra note 1, at 6-7. This distinction, however, has no bearing on the developments dis-
cussed in this paper. For purposes of this paper, tie-ins will be treated together with
other vertical restraints.
5. One of the principal changes brought about by the economic efficiency approach
has been a recognition that vertical restraints may well have procompetitive effects in the
interbrand market. See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Anti-
trust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 Va. L. Rev.
1221, 1231-37 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Deci-
sions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282, 283-85 (1975); see also infra note 53 and accompanying
text.
6. The list of concerns that are dismissed as "noneconomic" includes: prosperity of
small businesses; intrabrand competition; autonomy for independent business people;
political and economic deconcentration; increased product diversity; and diversification
of wealth. See William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
"Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661, 693 (1982); Eleanor M.
Fox, The Modernization ofAntitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140, 1153-
54, 1182 (1981); Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30
UCLA L. Rev. 1, 19-20 (1982); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051, 1058-60 (1979).
7. See Flynn, supra note 1, at 1138 (Congress did not "envision the enshrinement of
the abstract and unrealistic neoclassical concept of efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust
policy"); Fox, supra note 6, at 1146 (economic and noneconomic goals are complemen-
tary and both should be accommodated); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chi-
cago, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 245-47 (1985) (economic and noneconomic concerns cannot
be separated from one another); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J.
67, 68 (1982) (primary concern of antitrust laws was the transfer of wealth from consum-
ers to firms with market power); Pitofsky, supra note 6, at 1051 ("It is bad history, bad
policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust laws."
Noneconomic goals should be used as tie-breakers.); Louis B. Schwartz, "Justice" and
Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1076, 1076 (1979)
(noneconomic goals should be used to shift burden of persuasion to defendant).
8. See Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 217-26; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act
and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1019, 1021-26 (1989) [hereinaf-
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increasingly tidy antitrust law of vertical restraints.' Previously, courts
routinely grappled with amorphous concepts like trader freedom and
fairness and attempted to balance effects in the interbrand and intrabrand
markets. 10 Under the economic efficiency approach, in contrast, courts
analyze all vertical restraints by asking: Does this activity hinder inter-
brand competition?" If not, there is no reason to restrict it because com-
petition in the interbrand market will inevitably act as a check on the
supplier, who in furthering his own interests also protects the con-
sumer.12 Under this approach, the procedure for handling antitrust cases
ter Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act]; Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Reformed Antitrust Ap-
proach to Distributor Terminations, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 271, 297-301 (1992).
9. See infra notes 74 and 75 and accompanying text. Herbert Hovenkamp notes that
"[o]ne of the greatest achievements of Chicago School antitrust policy... is a claim to
consistency that cannot be made by any alternative approach that requires the 'balancing'
of competing interests." Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 234. Conversely, the economic
efficiency approach has led to a somewhat less tidy law of horizontal restraints. Whereas
previously virtually all horizontal cartels were held to be per se illegal, the economic
efficiency approach-with its emphasis on banning only those practices that raise prices
or restrict output-has led to an increasing number of horizontal restraints being re-
viewed under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 297 (1985) (rule of reason analysis may be neces-
sary to judge a member's expulsion from a joint buying co-operative); NCAA v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (rule of reason used to evaluate the competitive signifi-
cance of a restraint of trade by sports association); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979) (blanket licensing agreement should be
analyzed under the rule of reason); see also Richard S. Wirtz, Rethinking Price-Fixing, 20
Ind. L. Rev. 591 (1987) (discussing when a horizontal case falls into rule of reason
analysis).
10. The economic efficiency advocates soundly criticized this approach precisely be-
cause the inclusion of such factors resulted in a messy, sometimes confusing body of law.
See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself 280
(1978) ("The law of resale price maintenance and vertical market division is not only at
war with sound antitrust policy but is decidedly peculiar even on its own terms."); Rich-
ard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 164 (1976) (Vertical cases "are
an intellectual failure of imposing dimensions."); Tyler A. Baker, Interconnected
Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way
Out?, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1457, 1457 (1981) (The vertical restraint rules "are a jumble of
pieces that simply do not fit together."); Baxter, supra note 1, at 933 ("The vertical rules
have had a chaotic, an anti-intellectual, and in some senses, a belated development.").
11. Courts can, to be sure, misapply the economic efficiency theory by purporting to
protect interbrand competition but, in actuality, applying a test or criterion that fails to
further that goal. See, e.g., Jean W. Bums, Rethinking the "Agreement" Element in Ver-
tical Antitrust Restraints, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 27-31 (1990) (the Supreme Court's require-
ments for a vertical conspiracy are at odds with its purported economic efficiency
approach); C. Douglas Floyd, Vertical Antitrust Conspiracies After Monsanto and Russell
Stover, 33 Kan. L. Rev. 269 (1985) (disparity between Monsanto test and Court's applica-
tion of test to facts); Wesley J. Liebeler, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Wel-
fare: Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 36 UCLA L. Rev. 889, 897
(1989) (criticizing Supreme Court for adopting formalistic rules not necessarily linked to
injury to interbrand market); Posner, supra note 1, at 10 (court erred in establishing
different rules for vertical price and nonprice restraints).
12. See infra notes 52, 54 and 59 and accompanying text. The economic efficiency
theory is based on fairly elementary principles of economics such as the laws of supply
and demand. The economic bases are laid out in Bork, supra note 10, at 90-115; Posner,
supra note 10, at 8-22. Lurking behind the entire Chicago School theory is an assumption
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has also been simplified. Courts are now able to dismiss many vertical
antitrust cases on preliminary motions under standing doctrines, 3 ever-
stricter per se rules,14 and a rule-of-reason analysis that focuses on
"hard" factors such as market share and market power.' 5
While there is no denying the tidiness and consistency of the economic
efficiency theory, recent developments indicate that it suffers from two
fatal flaws. First, there is growing evidence that it is incomplete, in the
sense of ignoring issues that society wants considered.' 6 Second, consum-
ers are increasingly indicating that they simply do not believe the
theory.17
The first flaw, the incompleteness of the economic efficiency approach,
becomes apparent when one looks beyond antitrust to the larger array of
laws dealing with vertical restraints. For too long antitrust scholars have
been looking solely at what has been happening within antitrust. 18 How-
ever, the law of vertical restraints is a good deal broader. The law also
includes state franchise and unfair trade practice statutes and a variety of
common law theories. 9 In this larger array, the noneconomic goals that
the economic efficiency theory dismisses as irrelevant are resurfacing and
that the supplier is a rational actor. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Pol-
icy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1709 (1986). Saul Bellow has characterized this premise as a
belief "that between humankind and full chaos there stands only the free market." Saul
Bellow, More Die of Heartbreak 144 (1987). Not surprisingly, critics of the Chicago
School question its premises. See, e.g., Peter C. Carstensen & Richard F. Dahlson, Verti-
cal Restraints in Beer Distribution: A Study of the Business Justifications For and Legal
Analysis of Restricting Competition, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 1, 34-39; William S. Comanor,
Vertical Arrangements and Antitrust Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1153, 1153 (1987);
Gregory S. Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Con-
fronting the Problems of Nonfalsfiability and Normative Bias, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev.
231, 239 (1991); Flynn, supra note 1, at 1126-38; Warren S. Grimes, The Seven Myths of
Vertical Price Fixing: The Politics and Economics of a Century-Long Debate, 21 Sw. U. L.
Rev. 1285, 1301-12 (1992); Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 233-43; Louis Kaplow, Exten-
sion of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 515, 520-25 (1985);
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Sharp Dealing: The Horizontal/Vertical Dichotomy in Distribu-
tor Termination Cases, 38 Emory L.J. 311, 328 (1989); David F. Shores, Vertical Price-
Fixing and the Contract Conundrum: Beyond Monsanto, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 377, 401-
06 (1985); W.D. Slawson, A New Concept of Competition: Reanalyzing Tie-in Doctrine
After Hyde, 30 Antitrust Bull. 257, 263-73 (1985); Terry R. Weiss, The Dealer-Services
Rationale for Resale Price Maintenance: Does the Manufacturer Really Know Best?, 30 St.
Louis U. L.J. 517, 521-31 (1986); White, supra note 1, at 39-47.
13. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
16. See infra part II.
17. See infra part III.
18. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 1. Similarly on two occasions this author
has dealt with the logical ramifications of the economic efficiency approach within anti-
trust. See Bums, supra note 11; Jean W. Burns, The New Role of Coercion in Antitrust, 60
Fordham L. Rev. 379 (1991).
19. One recent, although small, survey found a steep decline in the number of purely
antitrust lawsuits being filed but an increase in the number of cases alleging both antitrust
and state tort claims. See Harvey I. Saferstein, The Ascendancy of Business Tort Claims
in Antitrust Practice, 59 Antitrust L.J. 379, 383-84 (1991).
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receiving consideration.2' State legislatures and courts are requiring
case-by-case inquiries into dealer fairness and general business ethics
and, in effect, circumventing the simplicity and logic of the "new" anti-
trust learning.21
The second flaw in the economic efficiency approach, its perceived lack
of connection with the real world, is evident in the growing public criti-
cism of the economic theory and vertical restraints in particular.' So-
phisticated consumer groups, the popular press, and elected officials are
all increasingly indicating that, contrary to economic theory, they regard
dealer protection and intrabrand competition as vital for market effi-
ciency and low prices. 23 Rather than supporting the economic efficiency
theory, which purports to be pro-consumer, consumer lobbies are work-
ing to undo its effects.24 In the past, some antitrust scholars have, to be
sure, questioned the validity of the economic approach.' What is new,
however, is the widespread skepticism now being expressed by sophisti-
cated consumer groups.
This Article explores these dual flaws in the economic efficiency ap-
proach and their ramifications. Part I briefly reviews the ascendancy of
economic theory in vertical antitrust law and the concurrent dismissal of
all noneconomic concerns. Part II explores the incompleteness of cur-
rent antitrust jurisprudence and the emergence of other legal theories
focusing on the noneconomic concerns banished from antitrust. Part III
surveys the public perception that the economic approach is unrelated to
reality. Part IV discusses the ramifications of these two developments on
current and future vertical restraint law.
This Article argues that the law cannot ignore the public's sense of
incompleteness and unreality regarding the economic efficiency ap-
proach. The emergence of the new dealer remedies outside of antitrust
indicates that society wants the law to take into account noneconomic
concerns. While antitrust may be responding to society's desire for eco-
nomic efficiency,26 the emergence of noneconomic concerns in other ar-
20. See infra part II.
21. Proponents of the economic efficiency theory admit that their approach is new in
that it is a change from traditional antitrust theory, but they argue that antitrust jurispru-
dence must be refined and adjusted as economic learning advances. See Bork, supra note
10, at 418-25; Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 Tex. L.
Rev. 705, 706 (1982); Posner, supra note 5, at 282, 287.
22. See infra part III. This article explores only consumer reaction to the economic
efficiency theory of vertical restraints. It is beyond the scope of this article to canvass the
public's reaction to current antitrust analysis of horizontal restraints, mergers or
monopolies.
23. See infra notes 151-62 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text.
25. See supra notes 7 and 12. See also authorities cited infra note 145.
26. The economic efficiency theory may be an internally accurate theory in the sense
of drawing logically correct conclusions from certain given premises. It is beyond the
scope of this article either to (1) assess the accuracy of the original premises or (2) assess
whether the conclusions have been correctly drawn. Scholars have previously considered
both of these issues. See authorities cited supra note 12. The questions raised by this
1993]
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eas of the law demonstrates that the economic efficiency model is not
providing a complete answer to society's concerns. Additionally, the
new remedies reflect the public's skepticism toward basic premises of the
economic approach. This Article argues that given these developments,
the new dealer remedies cannot and should not be curtailed.17 Instead,
courts should reconsider their almost total reliance on the economic effi-
ciency approach in analyzing vertical restraints under the antitrust laws.
No theory, no matter how internally logical, consistent, or simplifying,
will long survive if that theory is not believed and does not suit society's
needs.
I. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY APPROACH TO VERTICAL
RESTRAINTS
The very nature of vertical restraints requires that the law make a se-
ries of difficult choices and accommodations.28 First is the question of
how to assess the economic effect of the restraint which lessens in-
trabrand competition between dealers of the same brand but arguably
increases interbrand competition by enabling a supplier to offer consum-
ers a package of product plus service.29 The law must determine which
result has greater competitive impact and how to balance, if at all, losses
in one market with gains in the other." Second is the issue of whose
article are whether this theory excludes matters that are of concern to society and
whether this theory is seen by consumers as comporting with marketplace reality.
27. In the past years, scholars have debated whether the noneconomic goals ought to
be disregarded based on the legislative history of the antitrust laws. This article argues
that, in an important sense, this debate is moot. The newly emerging dealer remedies and
public outcry against vertical restraints show that society currently wants noneconomic
matters considered. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
28. Because of their fundamentally different nature, horizontal restraints do not in-
volve these same choices and accommodations. The Supreme Court categorized horizon-
tal restraints as per se illegal by 1927, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 397-400 (1927), and viewed them as "'plainly anticompetitive,'" Catalano Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646 (1980) (quoting National Soc'y of Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679,692 (1978)). For a discussion of the elemental differences between
horizontal and vertical restraints and the effect of those differences on antitrust jurispru-
dence, see Burns, supra note 11, at 7-16.
29. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1977) ("The
market impact of vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simulta-
neous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition.").
According to economic efficiency theory, a consumer who does not like a particular prod-
uct-service package being offered by one seller will simply purchase a package offered by
another seller in the interbrand market. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and Fed-
eral Antitrust Law § 9.2, at 252-54 (1985); Baxter, supra note 1, at 944-45; Easterbrook,
supra note 1, at 144-45; Hay, supra note 1, at 437; Posner, supra note 1, at 22-23; see infra
note 53. But see Carstensen & Dahlson, supra note 12, at 41-42 (arguing that for con-
sumers who are brand loyal, intrabrand competition is essential for low prices); Grimes,
supra note 1, at 848 (arguing that intrabrand competition is an economically significant
way of attaining low consumer prices); Piraino, supra note 12, at 328 (arguing that in-
trabrand competition benefits consumers by reducing prices and encouraging efficient and
innovative retailing).
30. Professor Liebeler, an economic efficiency advocate, argues that there are no in-
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marketing decisions should trump--the supplier's or the dealer's?
Whereas all members of a horizontal cartel benefit from the cartel's
higher prices,3 1 the two principal parties in a vertical "agreement" fre-
quently disagree about the restraint,32 with each claiming a property
right in the product being marketed3 3 and each claiming to represent the
interests of the consumer.34 Finally, there is the problem of how, if at all,
to accommodate the so-called noneconomic concerns.35 Specifically, if
one assumes that a court is able to evaluate the mixed interbrand-in-
trabrand consequences of a vertical restraint, should the economic conse-
quences be determinative or should the court also consider matters like
trader freedom, fairness, and business ethics?36
trabrand economic consequences of vertical restraint because there is no reduction in out-
put in the interbrand market. He concludes that the only economic effect of a vertical
restraint is in the interbrand market, making balancing of interbrand-intrabrand effects
unnecessary. See Liebeler, supra note 6, at 18-19. See also Hovenkamp, supra note 29,
§ 9.4, at 268-69.
31. All co-conspirators in a horizontal cartel realize supra-competitive profits
through concerted action which allows them to charge monopolistic prices. See Bums,
supra note 18, at 383. Thus, the horizontal plan can truly be said to involve "a unity of
purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful
arrangement." American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946). Each
participant in the horizontal cartel has an incentive to cheat on the conspiracy (by selling
more units at a below-cartel price), but even the cheater wants the other firms to continue
acting in concert to keep industry prices high. See Hovenkamp, supra note 29, § 4.1;
Posner, supra note 10, at 51-55.
32. The vertical agreement is, thus, a conceptual oddity: it is an agreement that is
often forced on one party, usually the dealer. See Burns, supra note 11, at 13-16. This
author has argued elsewhere that the Supreme Court has ignored the fundamental differ-
ences between the horizontal agreement and the vertical agreement and has erroneously
tried to transplant concepts from the former into the latter. See id. at 16-25.
33. The supplier claims that included within his right not to sell his property at all is
a right to sell subject to resale restrictions. The dealer, on the other hand, argues that any
attempt by the supplier to set resale terms contravenes the common law doctrine of alien-
ation which says that once property has been sold, the seller cannot restrict the buyer's
right to resell. See Grimes, supra note 12, at 1293. For an analysis of vertical restraints
as a tension between property rights and competition, see Peritz, supra note 1, at 516-17,
544-54.
34. The supplier contends that he is protecting the consumer by invigorating inter-
brand competition through vertical restraints. On the other hand, the dealer contends
that her marketing freedom aids the consumer by creating intrabrand competition.
35. In contrast, the horizontal restraint does not require a court to choose among
competing concerns. Because the horizontal cartel restrains interbrand competition, it is
economically inefficient in allowing participating firms to act as a monopolist with supra-
competitive prices and restricted output. See Hovenkamp, supra note 29, § 4.1, at 83;
Posner, supra note 2, at 960. In addition, the horizontal restraint meets the other goals of
the antitrust laws: it intrudes on the individual marketing decisions of each participating
firm; it coerces buyers into paying higher prices; and it leads to a concentration of eco-
nomic and political power. See Burns, supra note 11, at 7-8; Fox, supra note 6, at 1183.
With respect to the role of coercion in horizontal restraints, see Burns, supra note 18, at
381-85.
36. If one accepts the economic efficiency argument that most vertical restraints en-
hance efficiency by spurring on interbrand competition, see infra note 53, then there is
inevitably a head-on collision between economic efficiency and concern for dealer free-
dom. See Burns, supra note 11, at 6-7. A vertical restraint may well deprive a dealer of
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The history of antitrust vertical restraint law can be seen as an attempt
to answer these questions. Many commentators (including this one)"
have reviewed this history in detail and, for present purposes, a brief
summary of overall trends will suffice.
Up until the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court achieved a wobbly, some-
times inconsistent, accommodation of competing interests in its analysis
of vertical restraints under the antitrust laws. 8 The Court credited in-
trabrand competition with providing some economic benefit but also rec-
ognized the supplier's potential use of vertical restraints to increase
interbrand competition.39 In addition, out of concern for trader freedom,
some or all of her marketing freedom regarding a product but, absent a manufacturer or
dealer cartel, it may nonetheless be procompetitive (and hence economically efficient) in
the interbrand market.
37. See Burns, supra note 11, at 16-31; Calvani & Berg, supra note 1, at 1167-78;
Richard E. Day, Dealer Terminations and Resale Price Maintenance: Paradox Revisited,
40 S.C. L. Rev. 339, 346-68 (1989); Joseph E. Fortenberry, A History of the Antitrust Law
of Vertical Practices, 11 Res. L. & Econ. 133 (1988); Grimes, supra note 12, at 1287-93;
Edward H. Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price Mainte-
nance, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 258; Peritz, supra note 1; White, supra note 1, at 16-37. The
history of tying cases is reviewed in Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying
Arrangements: Antitrust as History, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1013 (1985).
38. Many scholars criticize the early antitrust law of vertical restraints as being a
confusing compilation of conflicting policies and theories. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 11,
at I (case law is "full of Byzantine twists and turns and hairsplitting distinctions"); Hay,
supra note 1, at 418 (Supreme Court has used a "piecemeal approach" to vertical re-
straints); M. Laurence Popofsky & Stephen V. Bomse, From Sylvania to Monsanto: No
Longer a "Free Ride", 30 Antitrust Bull. 67, 68 (1985) ("[D]ecisions reflect a struggle to
deal with an emerging economic consensus while attempting.., to preserve competing
political values.").
39. In the area of vertical nonprice restraints, the mixed economic results were cited
as one reason to use a rule of reason analysis. See United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350, 359-60 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("With respect to vertical restrictions, it has
long been recognized that in order to engage in effective interbrand competition, some
limitations on intrabrand competition may be necessary .... For these reasons [vertical]
territorial limitations ... should be tested by the rule of reason.); White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("While territorial re-
strictions may indirectly have a[n] ... effect [similar to that of vertical price restraints]
upon intra-brand competition, the effect upon inter-brand competition is not necessarily
the same as that of resale price maintenance."). Even when the Court opted to place
some vertical nonprice restraints in the per se illegal category (those involving sales to
dealers), the Court left similar restraints (in consignment situations) under the rule of
reason precisely because the interbrand-intrabrand consequences of the restraints were
uncertain. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 378-81 (1967). In
dealing with vertical pricing restraints, the Court quickly moved to a per se illegal rule,
see United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960); United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 722 (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S.
441, 452-53 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210-11
(1921); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920), but even so, the
Court acknowledged that the manufacturer may be imposing such restraints as a way of
creating nonprice interbrand competition. See Albrecht v. Herald Publishing Co., 390
U.S. 145, 151 n.7 (1968) ("Maintaining minimum resale prices would benefit manufactur-
ers when the total demand for their product would not be increased as much by the lower
prices brought about by dealer competition as by some other nonprice, demand-creating
activity.").
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the Court simultaneously protected the dealer's marketing decisions'
and guaranteed a supplier the right to choose dealers and assert some
resale controls.4" By doing so, the Court gave weight to both economic
interests in increased competition and noneconomic factors such as
trader independence.42 The upshot was an unartful body of case law that
recognized some marketing freedom (albeit limited) for the supplier,4 3
40. The Supreme Court regarded trader freedom, especially for the dealer, as having
two-fold importance: (1) it preserved the dealer's "independent discretion," United States
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); and (2) it protected the "free and natural
flow" of the competitive market, Schrader's 252 U.S. at 99-100. See also Albrecht, 390
U.S. at 152 (a vertical maximum price fixing scheme "substitut[es] the perhaps erroneous
judgment of a seller for the forces of a competitive market.").
41. The result was the uneasy coexistence of decisions like Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), with its emphasis on dealer independence,
along side of Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307, which attempted to safeguard the supplier. In Dr.
Miles, the Court noted that the manufacturer seeking to impose a vertical restraint "re-
strict[s] the freedom of trade on the part of dealers who own what they sell," and, as
such, is contrary to the "[public] interest in every person's carrying on his trade freely
.... All interference with individual liberty of action in trading... if there is nothing
more, are contrary to public policy, and therefore void." 220 U.S. at 406-08. The
Supreme Court repeated this concern for trader freedom in a number of subsequent deci-
sions. See e.g., Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152 (vertical restraints "'cripple the freedom of
traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judg-
ment.' ") (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213
(1951)); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964) ("A supplier may not use
coercion on its retail outlets to achieve resale price maintenance."); Bausch & Lomb, 321
U.S. at 721 (A distributor "sells to its wholesalers at prices satisfactory to itself. Beyond
that point it may not project its power over the prices of its wholesale customers by
agreement.") In contrast, the Supreme Court, in Colgate, was concerned with the manu-
facturer's freedom to deal with whomever he wished and held that where a manufacturer
announced resale prices and then simply refused to sell to those who did not abide by
those terms, there was no Sherman Act violation. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307. The
Court noted that the Sherman Act "does not restrict the long recognized right of trader
or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own in-
dependent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." Id.; see also Bausch & Lomb
321 U.S. at 728-29 (business has "right to select its customers").
42. The Dr. Miles decision, for instance, rested on both the trader-freedom rationale
and a view that a vertical restraint, by eliminating competition among dealers, acted anal-
ogously to a horizontal restraint. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 407-08. Similarly in its early
tie-in cases, the Court looked to both economic consequences on other sellers in the inter-
brand tied-product market and the coercive effect on the buyer to justify condemning
some restraints. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962) (Tie-ins
"are an object of antitrust concern for two reasons-they may force buyers into giving up
the purchase of substitutes for the tied product.., and they may destroy the free access
of competing suppliers of the tied product to the consuming market."); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (Tie-ins "deny competitors free access to the
market for the tied product" and "buyers are forced to forego their free choice between
competing products."); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
605 (1953) ("By [tying products] a seller coerces the abdication of buyers' independent
judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits and insulates it from the competitive stresses of
the open market.").
43. The Supreme Court used the agreement element of the § 1 violation to try to
distinguish between legal and illegal vertical arrangements. Provided the supplier stayed
within the Colgate guidelines, see supra note 41, there was said to be no agreement and
hence no § I violation. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307. If, however, the supplier went
beyond the simple Colgate scenario and conditioned his sale to dealers on an understand-
19931
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
protected the dealer from coercive," as opposed to persuasive, pressure
from a supplier,45 gave weight to both the interbrand and intrabrand eco-
nomic consequences of vertical restraints," and acknowledged some rele-
vance for noneconomic concerns.4 7
ing that they would resell on specified terms, used others to enforce his terms, or coerced
the dealer, then an agreement and a section one violation were present. See Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 & n.6 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29, 36-47 (1960). Scholars have been virtually unanimous in denouncing the
Supreme Court's unilateral action versus agreement distinction as artificial and formalis-
tic. See Baker, supra note 10, at 1474 ("[O]nly a particularly artificial and restricted
notion of concerted action could explain the distinction between Colgate and Dr. Miles.");
Burns, supra note 11, at 18-19 ("Obviously, the distinction drawn by Colgate and its
progeny between legal and illegal vertical arrangements was based on a highly strained
and artificial interpretation of agreement."); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Case for
Presuming the Legality of Quality Motivated Restrictions on Distribution, 63 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1988) ("The distinction ... between unilateral and concerted conduct is
simply illogical."); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman
Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 655, 686-87 (1962)
("[A] distinction between a program of resale price maintenance effected by contracts and
'agreements,' and one effected by threats of refusal to deal, is wholly untenable.").
44. Over time coercion of the dealer became an increasingly important factor in justi-
fying the application of the antitrust laws to vertical restraints, in determining the exist-
ence of an agreement and in assessing a co-conspirator/dealer's standing. For a detailed
discussion of the role of coercion in early vertical restraint and tie-in cases, see Bums,
supra note 18, at 385-93, 414-17. Professor Hovenkamp argues that this concern with
coercion was part of the classic economic model that saw buyers and sellers as "in compe-
tition" with one another and regarded any restraint on individual freedom as anticompe-
titive. See Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act, supra note 8, at 1026-27.
45. In the years following Colgate, lower courts distinguished between persuasion(which was held not to give rise to an agreement) and coercion (which did give rise to an
agreement) in determining the legality of a manufacturer's action in imposing vertical
restraints. See, e.g., Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 709 F.2d 1257, 1263 (9th Cir.)
(holding that dealer complaints occurring before termination of another dealer do not on
their own raise the inference of an unlawful combination; rather there must be a showing
of direct coercion or a "causal nexus" between the complaints and termination), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1980)
(requiring a showing of coercion); Reed Bros., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486, 495-
96 (8th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976); Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469
F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1972) (same), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973). See 7 Phillip E.
Areeda, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application
1440(a) (1986) (persuasion vs. coercion distinction served the function of letting supplier
make marketing suggestions to dealer). A similar distinction was necessary in tying cases
because a buyer who was persuaded (as opposed to coerced) into taking both the tied and
tying products was held to lack standing to challenge the tie-in. See, e.g., Murphy v.
Business Cards of Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) (franchisees'
tying claim fails when unable to show that they did not voluntarily buy equipment from
franchisor), overruled by Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir.
1990); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1219-25 (3d Cir.) (plaintiff-
buyer in tying case must prove individualized coercion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Class Actions, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 213,
226 (1983). Arthur Austin suggests that courts use coercion in this sense to avoid giving
a windfall to an "undeserving" buyer in a tying sale. See Arthur D. Austin, The Individ-
ual Coercion Doctrine in Tie-In Analysis: Confusing and Irrelevant, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 1143,
1152 (1977).
46. See supra note 39.
47. See supra notes 40 & 42.
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In the mid-1970s, the Chicago School's economic efficiency approach
to vertical restraints began gaining prominence in the courts.48 Briefly,4 9
the hallmarks of this approach are the following tenets. First and fore-
most, adherents argue that economic efficiency should be the sole goal of
antitrust.50 Second, they dismiss all other concerns as economically irrel-
evant.5 Third, they emphasize interbrand, as opposed to intrabrand,
competition as the key to insuring low prices and efficiency.52 Fourth,
they view the vast majority of vertical restraints as economically efficient
ways of offering consumers different product-service choices.53 Fifth,
48. The Chicago School's economic efficiency theory dates back to the 1950s but did
not begin gaining acceptance in the Supreme Court until the mid-1970s with the decision
in Continental T. , Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
49. The economic efficiency theory of vertical restraints has been described in detail
elsewhere. See eg., Easterbrook, supra note 1 at 140-53; Page, supra note 5, at 1229-43;
Posner, supra note 5, at 283-94.
50. See Bork, supra note 10, at 20-21; Posner, supra note 10, at 19-20; Baxter, supra
note 6, at 693; Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 138-40; Page, supra note 5, at 1238.
51. See Bork, supra note 10, at 54-56 (rejecting the argument that the antitrust laws
include social or political purposes); Posner, supra note 10, at 19 ("antitrust enforcement
is an inappropriate method of trying to promote the interests of small business"); Baxter,
supra note 1, at 693 (arguing that to the extent noneconomic concerns are inconsistent
with economic efficiency, the former "have no part in the objectives of antitrust law");
Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 715-16 (arguing that even if Congress wanted to protect
small businesses or trader freedom, the antitrust laws are ill-suited for furthering these
goals). The economic efficiency advocates similarly dispense with coercion as a rationale
for condemning tie-ins. See Baker, supra note 10, at 1317-18 ("history of the coercion
requirement is one of confusion and tortured distinctions"; coercion in the sense of buyer
freedom should be eliminated from tying analysis); Richard N. Pearson, Tying Arrange-
ments and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U. L. Rev. 626, 632 (1965) ("Of all the claims of
alleged evils of tying arrangements, [buyer coercion] has the least merit, for the charge is
really nothing more than that the seller has made the best deal he can."). Indeed, one
economic efficiency advocate has warned that those who fail to use this approach "will
soon find themselves mired in a morass of standardless subjectivity." Wesley 3. Liebeler,
What Are The Alternatives To Chicago?, 1987 Duke L.J. 879, 880.
52. See Posner, supra note 10, at 147-51; Baxter, supra note 1, at 936-46; Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1984). With respect to tie-
ins, see Baker, supra note 10, at 1268 (arguing that a tie-in should be objectionable only
when it results in an increase in prices or reduction in output in the tied market or is
otherwise economically inefficient).
53. The typical supplier imposes such restraints, the argument goes, not to price-
gouge the public or to provide his dealer with supra-competitive profits but to force the
dealer to provide services to the community. Using vertical restraints to give dealers
excess profits would be counter-productive because the result would be higher retail
prices and, consequently, lower sales. See Bork, supra note 10, at 290 ("No manufacturer
... will ever use... resale price maintenance... for the purpose of giving the resellers a
greater-than-competitive return."). See also Posner, supra note 10, at 152-53 (asserting
that the profits generated by the minimum retail price may be an advantage to the con-
sumer); Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 146-47. Instead, the supplier is seeking to force his
dealer to provide a variety of services to the consumer, including advertising, showrooms,
and "certification" by upscale dealers. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 150; Victor P.
Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing and the Economics of Retailing
Services, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 736, 738-48 (1984). Through vertical restraints, the argu-
ment goes, the supplier offers the consumer a package of product plus service-a package
that the supplier believes will be more competitive on the interbrand market than that
product alone. If the consumer does not want this package, she will simply choose a
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they contend that the supplier's marketing choices must prevail over
those of the dealer if consumer welfare is to be maximized.54 Sixth, the
theory characterizes the discounting dealer as a renegade free rider who
effectively steals from the supplier and other dealers." Finally, the eco-
different product-service package in the interbrand market. See Baxter, supra note 1, at
945-46; Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 146-50; Posner, supra note 1, at 22-23; Posner,
supra note 2, at 926-30. Adherents to the economic efficiency approach argue that price
and nonprice vertical restraints function in the same way and should be treated the same
under the antitrust laws. See Posner, supra note 10, at 160; Easterbrook, supra note 52,
at 14. Under this theory, a vertical restraint will be economically inefficient only if it is
imposed by a supplier or dealer cartel. See infra note 58.
Economic efficiency advocates similarly regard the vast majority of tie-ins as economi-
cally efficient ways of offering the buyer another "package" from which to choose, See
William K. Jones, The Two Faces of Fortner: Comment On A Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78
Colum. L. Rev. 39, 40-45 (1978) (competitors should be told: "Go ye and do likewisel");
Pearson, supra note 51, at 635-37. Alternatively, these advocates believe that tie-ins may
safeguard the goodwill or quality of the tying product. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19, 29 (1957); Joseph G. Sidak,
Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1121, 1136-37 (1983) (noting that
seller's interest in safeguarding quality control is especially important when buyer has
limited understanding of the tied product or when seller faces potential product liability
exposure). Economic efficiency advocates also believe that tie-ins allow the manufacturer
to take advantage of economies of scale in joint production or joint sale of two products.
See Posner, supra note 10, at 180-81; Bowman, supra, at 29.
Other commentators take issue with the Chicago School view that all dealer-provided
services are desired by all or most consumers. See, e.g., William S. Comanor, Vertical
Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98 Harvard L.
Rev. 983, 990-92 (1985) (criticizing the efficiency argument for its failure to incorporate
the different values that consumers apply to dealer-provided services); Edward 0. Cor-
reia, Resale Price Maintenance-Searching for a Policy, 18 Notre Dame J. Legis. 187,
213-17 (1992); Herbert Hovenkamp, Fact, Value and Theory in Antitrust Adjudication,
1987 Duke L.J. 897, 909-11 (criticizing Telser's assumption of parallel demand curves);
Levmore, supra note 1, at 986-90 (arguing that the free-rider problem can be solved by
downstream solutions); Weiss, supra note 12, at 523-33 (contending that the dealer-serv-
ices model will not lead to consumer welfare).
54. According to economic theory, the supplier, like the consumer, wants to maxi-
mize service and minimize the dealer's profits. To the supplier, the dealer's profits are in
essence a cost of distribution that increases the overall cost of the supplier's product in
the interbrand market. Since a higher price to the consumer will result in a lower sales
volume, the supplier will want to limit his dealer to earning only a competitive rate of
return. See Posner, supra note 10, at 147; Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 146-47; Posner,
supra note 5, at 283. In setting a resale price that exceeds costs, or in assigning exclusive
territories, the supplier is simply ensuring that dealers will compete among themselves by
providing services to consumers (who, when faced with a uniform price, will go to the
dealer providing the greatest service). See Posner, supra note 10, at 148. The dealer will
continue providing service until her marginal cost of distribution meets the resale price,
at which point she "will not be receiving any monopoly profits but will be furnishing
services at the level desired by the manufacturer." Id.; see Easterbrook, supra note 1, at
147-48. The supplier cannot simply lower his wholesale price to the dealers and hope
they will provide the desired service because of the inevitable "free-riding" dealer. See
infra note 55.
55. The discounter is able to offer a lower retail price only by riding on the services
provided by other dealers. Eventually the full service (and higher priced) dealers will go
out of business to the detriment of both the supplier (who loses distribution) and consum-
ers (who lose service). Thus, the discounting dealer who evades the supplier's vertical
restraints is a villain to economic efficiency and ultimately to the consumer. See Kenneth
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nomic efficiency advocates contend that the market, not the judicial sys-
tem, is the best method for correcting any poorly conceived vertical
restraint. 5
6
What appears to be a pro-manufacturer bias in the approach is justified
as being pro-consumer.57 According to economic theory, absent a cartel
on the supplier or dealer level,5" any vertical restraint that exists over
Kelly, The Role of the Free Rider in Resale Price Maintenance. The Loch Ness Monster of
Antitrust Captured, 10 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 327, 338 (1988); Posner, supra note 10, at
149; Telser, supra note 2, at 91-92.
Economic theory teaches that in tying arrangements involving franchisees, the fran-
chisee who evades a tie-in is an even greater villain and the consumer's welfare is even
more closely associated with the supplier's interest. In patronizing a franchise, the con-
sumer is looking for a standardized product or service which the franchisor seeks to
ensure through tie-ins. A franchisee who does not depend on return business has an
incentive to provide less-costly, lower-quality goods or services and ride on the reputation
being upheld by other franchisees. Such free riding harms not only the franchisor and
"good" franchisee (by lowering the reputation of the franchise) but also the consumer
who pays full price for a product or service of lesser quality. See Baker, supra note 10, at
1277-78; Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying
Contracts, 28 J.L. & Econ. 345, 349-53 (1985); G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter,
The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & Econ. 503, 510 (1985).
A supplier could, of course, achieve the desired dealer services or product quality with-
out a vertical restraint or tie-in by simply requiring that all dealers provide specified
services or adhere to specified quality standards. Economists argue, however, that verti-
cal restrictions and tie-ins are often the cheapest, most efficient way of achieving the
supplier's goal. See Baker, supra note 10, at 1250-51; Klein & Saft, supra, at 352-54;
Posner, supra note 5, at 294.
56. Economic efficiency theory teaches that the market will correct for any poorly
conceived vertical restraint by penalizing the manufacturer with lower sales. See Posner,
supra note 10, at 150; Baxter, supra note 1, at 945-46; Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 148-
49. Courts, on the other hand, do a poor job of policing vertical restraints. See Michael
K. Block & Joseph G. Sidak, The Cost of Antitrust Deterrence: ;hy Not Hang a Price
Fixer Now & Then?, 68 Geo. L.J. 1131 (1980) (arguing that "antitrust enforcement is
costly because prosecutors and judges mischaracterize some competitive or efficiency-
enhancing behavior as horizontal collusion"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust
Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 Geo. L.J. 305 (1987) (courts are ill-equipped to decide anti-
trust cases and erroneous findings of illegality will have long-term market harm; courts
cannot successfully tamper with vertical restraints because a manufacturer can always
change the product that it sells to its dealers or do its own retailing); Douglas H. Gins-
burg, Vertical Restraints" De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 Antitrust L.J.
67, 69 (1992) (court cannot possibly know if decreased intrabrand competition is "worth"
increased interbrand competition); Page, supra note 5, at 1243 ("[C]ourts have limited
fact-finding and remedial capabilities, and therefore the costs of enforcing" antitrust rules
will be high.).
57. The consumer is aided, the argument goes, by having more product-service pack-
ages from which to choose and the minimizing of dealer profits. See Bork, supra note 10,
at 290; Baxter, supra note 1, at 946; Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 25-26; Easterbrook,
supra note 1, at 147; Klein & Murphy, supra note 1, at 282-85. But see Grimes, supra
note 1, at 824 (vertical restraints may harm consumers by encouraging dealers to pro-
mote goods of lesser quality or higher profit margin); White, supra note 1, at 53-59 (there
are less restrictive means other than resale price maintenance that supplier can use to
avoid free riding).
58. Economic efficiency advocates admit that a vertical restraint can be used to police
either a dealer or a supplier cartel and, if so, it will be economically inefficient. However,
they contend that such cartels are rare. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 1, at 941-45 (outlin-
ing the requirements necessary for a supplier cartel to use vertical restraints to facilitate
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time in a competitive interbrand market must be desirable to consumers
and consequently competition-enhancing.5 9
Beginning with its 1977 decision in Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania Inc.,6' the Supreme Court began gravitating toward this theory. In
Sylvania the Court resolved the interbrand-intrabrand quandary by an-
nouncing that "[i]nterbrand competition.., is the primary concern of
antitrust law."'" By 1988, with its decision in Business Electronics Corp.
v. Sharp Electronics Corp. ,62 the Court effectively eliminated concern for
the cartel); Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 142 (arguing that a dealer cartel involving a
single brand will be unsuccessful because consumers will simply switch to another brand
and because the supplier has no incentive to go along with the dealer cartel and will
switch dealers; "A manufacturer that helps dealers form a cartel is doing itself in. It will
sell less and dealers will get monopoly profits."); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCaf-
ferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 28 J.L. & Econ. 363, 374-77
(1985) (stating that retail price maintenance may have at one time preserved inefficient
systems, but concluding that "RPM will be efficiency enhancing when adopted willingly
by manufacturers"); Posner, supra note 10, at 148-53. But see Carstensen & Dahlson,
supra note 12, at 41-54 (arguing that dealer cartels are more likely to occur and be suc-
cessful where dealers carry multiple brands); White, supra note 1, at 39-46 (there can be
industry-wide monopoly pricing even without a cartel when there are common retailers).
With respect to tying arrangements, the economic efficiency advocates admit that such
restraints can be used for less-than-honorable goals like metering, price discrimination or
evasion of price controls. However, they also argue that not all such ties-even when so
used-are inefficient. The metering tie may be used as a means of offering a risk alloca-
tion, see Sidak, supra note 53, at 1135, the price-control-evading tie may be used to cut,
not raise, prices in a regulated industry, see Richard S. Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity,
and the Leverage Theory Part II: Tie Ins, Leverage and the American Antitrust Laws, 80
Yale L.J. 195, 226-27 (1970), a price discrimination tie may result in greater output in the
tying market, see Sidak, supra note 53, at 1144. See also Posner, supra note 10, at 178-80
(arguing that even if a price-discrimination tie is objectionable in that it increases a mo-
nopolist's profits, the antitrust laws are not the proper vehicle for regulating it).
59. See Baxter, supra note 6, at 697-98; Calvani & Berg, supra note 1, at 1182. In-
deed, for this reason, some economic efficiency advocates have contended that vertical
restraints should be presumptively or per se legal. See Bork, supra note 10, at 288; see,
e.g., Baxter, supra note 1, at 947 ("[A]ll vertical arrangements should generally be pre-
sumed benign."); Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 5 (criticizing illegality of most vertical
restraints); Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 135; Posner, supra note 1, at 23 (proposing that
a rule of per se legality be used in vertical restraint cases). One critic of the economic
efficiency approach has summed up the theory as: "Over time's rainbow, in the radiance
of revelation, what is efficient is what is." Frederick M. Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust
and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 Geo. L.J.
1511, 1549 (1984). See also John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the
Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis
in the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1125, 1130-31 (1987) (eco-
nomic theory substitutes predetermined rules, assumptions and rigid deductive reasoning
for the traditional complex fact determination and inductive reasoning that is proper
legal analysis); Grimes, supra note 1, at 826-27 (disputing theory that disgruntled con-
sumer will necessarily switch quickly to another product).
60. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
61. Id. at 52 n.19. The Court noted that "[e]conomists have identified a number of
ways in which manufacturers can use [vertical] restrictions to compete more effectively
against other manufacturers," including "induc[ing] competent and aggressive retailers to
make.., investment of capital and labor .... to engage in promotional activities or to
provide service and repair facilities." Id. at 54-55.
62. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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intrabrand competition altogether from the analysis of vertical pricing
restraints.6 3 With tie-ins, the story was the same: the Court announced
in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde 6 that the anticompeti-
tive aspect (and hence the illegality) of a tie-in lies in its lessening of
competition in the interbrand market for the tied product. 65
On the question of whose marketing freedom should triumph, the
Court-again consistent with the economic efficiency approach--came
down squarely on the side of the supplier. The Court regarded the sup-
plier as having a "legitimate" concern with resale policies,66 as a means
of "further[ing] a particular marketing strategy" 67 or offering the con-
63. The Court reiterated the statement from Sylvania that interbrand competition is
the "primary concern" of the antitrust laws and added that "a rule of per se illegality...
[is] not needed or effective to protect intrabrand competition." 485 U.S. at 725. Vertical
price restraints had been treated as per se illegal, according to the Court, only because
"there was support for the proposition that [such] restraints reduce interbrand price com-
petition [by] 'facilitat[ing] cartelizing.'" Id. at 725 (citation omitted). Absent such a
likelihood of facilitating a horizontal interbrand cartel, a court ought not condemn a
vertical restraint because it might well have "real potential to stimulate interbrand com-
petition." Id at 724. The dissenting justices, on the other hand, emphasized the need to
consider loss in intrabrand competition:
[Flostering intrabrand competition has been recognized as an important goal of
antitrust law, and although a manufacturer's efficiency-enhancing vertical non-
price restraints may subject a reduction of intrabrand competition only to a rule
of reason analysis, a similar reduction without the procompetitive 'redeeming
virtues' of manufacturer-imposed vertical nonprice restraints... causes nothing
but economic harm.
Id. at 749 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
65. As with other vertical restraints, the Court acknowledged that tying arrange-
meats could be procompetitive in the interbrand market by offering buyers an "attrac-
five" package sale. See id at 12. "[I]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying
arrangement lies... [in its restraint on] competition on the merits in the market for the
tied item .... ." Ido "This impairment could either harm existing competitors or create
barriers to entry of new competitors in the market for the tied product." Id. at 14. The
Court also stated that a tie-in might be illegal if used for price discrimination or to evade
price controls on the tying product. See id at 15, 28 n.47. Notably absent, however, was
any notion that a tie-in's illegality might flow from its coercive effect on the buyer. See
infra note 71.
66. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984). In con-
trast, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), the
Court had regarded resale terms as a matter of concern primarily for dealers, not the
manufacturer. "[T]he advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the deal-
ers. The enlarged profits.., would go to them and not to the [manufacturer]." Id. at
407. To the extent the manufacturer was concerned about resale terms, the Court consid-
ered that concern to be outweighed by society's interest in preserving the dealer's market-
ing freedom. See id at 407-08.
67. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762.
[I]t is precisely in cases in which the manufacturer attempts to further a partic-
ular marketing strategy by means of agreements on often costly nonprice re-
strictions that it will have the most interest in the distributors' resale prices.
The manufacturer often will want to ensure that its distributors earn sufficient
profit to pay for programs such as hiring and training additional salesmen or
demonstrating the technical features of the product ....
In order to assure an efficient distribution system, manufacturers and distrib-
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sumer an attractive package. 68 The Court noted that, when so used, ver-
tical restraints increase interbrand competition 69 and properly permit the
manufacturer to guard against the destructive free-riding dealer who un-
dermines "good" dealers and ultimately competition in the interbrand
market.70 That a dealer might lose her "autonomy" or feel forced to
abide by resale policies or buy a tied product is, by itself, irrelevant.7
utors constantly must coordinate their activities to assure that their product will
reach the consumer persuasively and efficiently.
Id. at 762-64.
68. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977)
("[M]anufacturers can use [vertical restraints] to induce retailers to ... provide service
and repair facilities" which, in turn "affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the competi-
tiveness of his product."). The Court similarly saw the tie-in as often the result of "a
seller's decision to offer [an attractive sales package]" in an "attempt to compete effec-
tively." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). In her con-
curring opinion, Justice O'Connor expanded on the various procompetitive uses for a
tying arrangement:
[Tie-ins] may facilitate new entry into fields where established sellers have wed-
ded their customers to them .... They may permit clandestine price cutting in
products .... They may protect the reputation of the tying product ....
[T]hey may reduce costs through economies of joint production and
distribution.
Id. at 41 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Whatever the vertical restraint,
the Court noted, the manufacturer's "dominant incentive," like the consumer's, is "to
lower resale prices" in order "to meet [the] interbrand competition." Business Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725 (1988).
69. Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manu-
facturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products ....
For example, new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can
use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to
make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the
distribution of products unknown to the consumer. Established manufacturers
can use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to pro-
vide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their
products.
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55.
70. See, e.g., Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 ("Because of market imperfections such as the
so-called 'free rider' effect, [the manufacturer-desired] services might not be provided by
retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit
would be greater if all provided the services than if none did."); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1984)(manufacturer will use vertical restraints
"to see that 'free riders' do not interfere" with his marketing strategy); Sharp, 485 U.S. at
728 (quoting Monsanto).
71. In Sylvania, the Court specifically acknowledged that vertical restraints may re-
strict "the autonomy of independent businessmen even though [the restraints] have no
impact on 'price, quality, and quantity of goods and services,'" but concluded that this
was not a sufficient reason to apply per se liability, because "an antitrust policy divorced
from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at
53 n.21. In his concurring opinion, Justice White noted that this was a marked change
from the Court's earlier decisions. "[C]oncern for the freedom of the businessman to
dispose of his own goods as he sees fit ... [is a rationale that] runs through our case law
in the area of distributional restraints." Id. at 67-68 (White, J., concurring). Similarly, in
dealing with tie-ins, the Court was not willing to consider a tie illegal when the only effect
was coercion of the buyer.
[W]hen a purchaser is 'forced' to buy a product he would not have otherwise
bought even from another seller in the tied-product market, there can be no
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Absent a horizontal cartel or demonstrable effect in the interbrand mar-
ket, the vertical restraint is procompetitive.72 While vertical restraints
might well restrict the dealer's freedom, "an antitrust policy divorced
from market considerations," the Court announced, "would lack any ob-
jective benchmarks."73
By adopting this approach, the Supreme Court obtained neat, clean
answers to the complexities of vertical restraints. As an economic mat-
ter, interbrand competition prevails over intrabrand.74 Moreover, the
supplier's marketing decisions triumph over the dealer's. Finally, to the
extent there is a conflict between economic and noneconomic concerns,
the latter are dismissed as irrelevant."
Procedurally, the adoption of the economic efficiency approach had a
similarly streamlining effect. Consistent with the views of the economic
adverse impact on competition because no portion of the market which would
otherwise have been available to other sellers has been foreclosed.
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16. While the majority's opinion in Jefferson Parish is re-
plete with talk of "forcing" of buyers, the context indicates that the court was using the
"forcing" language as a short-hand way of referring to the need to show the seller had
power in the tying market. See Bums, supra note 18, at 422 n. 189; infra note 81.
72. In Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., the Court noted that vertical price
restraints are per se illegal because "there [is] support for the proposition that [they]
reduce interbrand price competition because they 'facilitate cartelizing.' [Dleparture from
[the rule of reason] standard must be justified by demonstrable economic effect, such as
the facilitation of cartelizing ...." 485 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1988). Using this reasoning,
the Court concluded that a vertical pricing agreement was per se illegal only if it set a
specific resale price, because only then would it likely facilitate a horizontal interbrand
cartel among manufacturers or dealers. See id. at 735-36.
73. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
74. Sylvania left open the possibility that in a rule of reason analysis of a vertical
nonprice restraint, the trier of fact might need to balance "intrabrand harm [and] inter-
brand benefit." Id at 52. Some economic efficiency advocates argue that such a balanc-
ing of essentially apples and oranges is impossible and ought not be attempted. See
Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 155 (rule of reason analysis is "snipe hunt"); Peter M.
Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for Intrabrand Restraints: An Anti-
trust Analysis, 1981 Duke L.J. 417, 438-39; Posner, supra note 2, at 14-18. Even one
critic of the Chicago approach has concluded, after a detailed review of the post-Sylvania
rule of reason cases, that the interbrand-intrabrand balance suggested by Sylvania is im-
possible to do (and leads to defendants almost always winning). See Mark E. Roszkow-
ski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and Its "Rule of Reason": The Dealer Termination
Cases and The Demise of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 129, 156-60
(1989). See also, Baxter, supra note 1, at 936 ("[T]hose practices subject only to the rule
of reason will rarely, if ever, be found illegal if a plaintiff... must carry the burden of
showing that human welfare is reduced by this particular use of the particular restriction
in this particular set of markets at this particular time.").
As a way of bringing some order to the rule of reason analysis, some lower courts
require that, as a threshold matter, the plaintiff prove (1) the relevant market and (2) the
defendant's power in that market. See infra note 82.
75. Technically, Sylvania only ruled out the use of dealer freedom as a factor in a per
se case. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21. The Court did not say that dealer freedom
could not be considered in a rule of reason analysis of a vertical nonprice restraint. How-
ever this possibility seems remote and, in practice, in the cases following Sylvania, the
lower courts have looked primarily (as the rest of the Sylvania opinion suggested) to
market effects. See infra note 82.
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efficiency advocates,76 the Supreme Court constructed a number of
standing rules to avoid over-deterrence," duplicative damage awards, 78
and remote claims.79 As a result, courts today are able to dismiss many
vertical restraint lawsuits at pleading stages.80 Furthermore, even when
76. The economic efficiency advocates argue that a particular activity can have both
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and that, to avoid overdeterrence, antitrust
awards should be limited to those damages flowing from the inefficient aspect of the activ-
ity. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1160 (1982); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for
Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 652, 655 (1983); William H. Page, The Scope of
Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1445, 1451-53 (1985). Indeed, some
economic proponents contend that all antitrust enforcement, public and private, is just a
supplement to the market which will effectively defeat most antitrust violations. See Eas-
terbrook, supra note 56, at 306-10; Howard P. Marvel et al., Price Fixing and Civil Dam-
ages: An Economic Analysis, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 561, 574 (1988). However, critics of the
Chicago School argue that the economic efficiency advocates understate the benefit of
private lawsuits. See Norman W. Hawker, The New Antitrust Paradox: Antitrust Injury,
44 Rutgers L. Rev. 101, 131-32 (1991); David Klingsberg, Balancing the Benefits and
Detriments of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Detrebling, Antitrust Injury, Standing and
Other Proposed Solutions, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1215, 1220-27 (1988); Robert Pitofsky, Does
Antitrust Have a Future?, 76 Geo. L.J. 321, 322-23 (1987).
77. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977), the
Supreme Court constructed an "antitrust injury" doctrine that limited standing to those
plaintiffs who could show injury flowing from "that which makes defendants' acts unlaw-
ful" under the antitrust laws. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S.
328 (1990), the Court applied the doctrine to vertical restraints and denied standing to a
firm complaining of a rival's maximum vertical price fixing. The economic efficiency
advocates applaud the antitrust injury standing requirement. See Page, supra note 5, at
1270-75; Page, supra note 76, at 1460-64. For criticism of the antitrust injury doctrine,
see John J. Flynn, Which Past Is Prolog? The Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 35
Antitrust Bull. 879, 914-16 (1990); Hawker, supra note 76, at 103-10.
78. To avoid duplicative damage awards, the Court held that indirect purchasers may
not sue for antitrust damages. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977).
The Illinois Brick rule has been applauded by economic efficiency advocates, see, e.g.,
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to
Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 602, 604 (1979) ("[A]llowing indirect purchasers to sue would probably
retard rather than advance antitrust enforcement."); William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust
Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2151, 2162 (1990), but has been
criticized by other commentators. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 77, at 907-10 ("[e]ver since
the decision, confusion has reigned over issues like who are indirect purchasers and
whether the concerns underlying Illinois Brick are present where overcharges caused by
an antitrust violation are passed through to an indirect plaintiff down the line of distribu-
tion."); Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge:
A Response to Landes and Posner, 128 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1280, 1284 (1980) (proposing a
reversal of Illinois Brick).
79. In Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540-45 (1983), the Court reiterated the Brunswick and Illinois
Brick requirements and, additionally, emphasized the need for the plaintiff to have suf-
fered directly from the antitrust violation. For a discussion of the effect of this decision,
see Nat Stern & Kevin B. Getzendanner, Gauging the Impact of Associated General Con-
tractors on Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
159 (1986).
80. See, e.g., Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788-89 (2d Cir.
1992) (supplier entitled to summary judgment on distributor's tying claim where distribu-
tor failed to show it was forced to take tied product or that supplier had power in tying
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a lawsuit survives to a review of the merits, courts apply increasingly
strict substantive requirements for per se liability8 or a rule-of-reason
analysis that uses a market-power screen 2 or absolves a defendant of
liability whenever there is any showing of gain in the interbrand
market); Bi-Rite Oil Co. v. Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass'n, 908 F.2d 200 (7th Cir.
1990) (summary judgment on resale price fixing claim proper where dealer failed to show
agreement on specific price); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania
House Group, Inc., 878 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1989) (summary judgment for supplier proper
where dealer failed to show agreement under Monsanto); Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1154-60 (9th Cir. 1988) (supplier entitled to judgment not with-
standing verdict where dealer failed to show conspiracy and setting of specific resale
price); Flynn, supra note 77, at 920 (summary judgment has been granted in whole or in
part in 50% of private cases in recent years); Roszkowski, supra note 74, at 183-86 (after
Monsanto, most dealers have lost vertical cases on summary judgment or directed ver-
dicts); Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis ofPrivate Antitrust Liti-
gation, 74 Geo. L.J. 1001, 1003 (1986) (empirical study showing decline in antitrust cases
filed in the 1980s).
81. After Monsanto and Sharp, resale price maintenance is still technically perse ille-
gal. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725 (1977); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-62 n.7 (1984). However, in order to
prove a violation a plaintiff will have to show (1) the meeting-of-the-minds type agree-
ment required by Monsanto; (2) the setting of a specific resale price as required by Sharp;
and (3) antitrust injury as required by USA Petroleum. See Burns, supra note 11, at 29-31
(discussing the difficulty of satisfying both Monsanto and Sharp); Peritz, supra note 1, at
550-51 (Supreme Court has shrunk per se category to point of collapse); Piraino, supra
note 12, at 315 ("Sharp actuaUy effected a de facto overruling of the per se approach");
White, supra note 1, at 34-35 (Sharp creates a per se legal category when there is no
agreement regarding specific prices and no agreement on a nonprice restraint). As one
antitrust practitioner has stated, "only the most poorly advised manufacturer will be
found liable for resale price fixing." Maxwell M. Blecher, The Impact of GTE Sylvania
on Antitrust Jurisprudence, 60 Antitrust L.J. 17, 20 (1991).
The perse rule for tying arrangements is equally formidable and requires a showing of
two distinct products, power in the tying market and effect in the tied market. See Jeffer-
son Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-16 (1984); Flynn, supra note 77, at
927 (for tying cases, per se no longer means "in itself" but "in itself along with a few
other mushy things").
82. Some economic efficiency advocates argue that if a rule of reason analysis is re-
tained for vertical restraints (and there has been some suggestion that a per se or pre-
sumptive legality rule would be better, see supra note 59), the analysis should focus on the
defendant's market share and market power. Without market share and power, the argu-
ment goes, the supplier cannot possibly restrain interbrand competition through the use
of a vertical restraint or tying arrangement. Therefore when a supplier lacking market
power uses a vertical restraint, the restraint must be producing a package that consumers
find desirable; if not, consumers will switch to another brand and the supplier, penalized
through lost sales, will abandon or modify the restraint or tie-in. See Easterbrook, supra
note I, at 157-68; Hay, supra note 1, at 441-42; Klein & Murphy, supra note 1, at 295.
Some lower courts have adopted this suggestion and require in any vertical rule of reason
case that the plaintiff prove, as preliminary matters, what the relevant market is and that
the defendant has power in that market. See, e.g., Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334-37 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that market power is a
necessary element under the rule of reason analysis); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v.
Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1983) (requiring proof of a "well-defined
relevant market upon which the challenged anticompetitive actions would have had a
substantial impact"). For criticism of this approach, see Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note
59, at 1150; David L. White, Antitrust Enforcement: Enhancement Through a Sharpened
Rule of Reason, 20 Ariz. St. L.J. 749, 759-69 (1988).
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market.8 3
The upshot is that courts are doing fewer case-by-case evaluations of
vertical restraints. Antitrust jurisprudence now rests on an economic
theory that provides a procompetitive justification for most vertical re-
straints.8 4 Moreover, under this theory, courts largely exclude considera-
tions of intrabrand competition and dealer fairness from their analyses. 85
Not surprisingly, vertical restraint and tying cases have become virtually
impossible for a plaintiff dealer to win.8 6
83. See Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 74-75 (analysis of vertical nonprice cases in which
rule of reason was applied shows that defendants typically win if there is any indication of
gain in the interbrand market).
84. Indeed, some critics of the Chicago approach complain that, in assessing the le-
gality of restraints, courts often seem to look more to economic models than the facts of
the particular dispute. See Flynn, supra note 1, at 1126-30; Flynn & Ponsoldt, supra note
59, at 1130-31.
85. Coercion does continue to be a limited factor in vertical cases. Some courts con-
tinue to look at coercion as a means of finding a conspiracy. See, e.g., World of Sleep,
Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1476 (10th Cir.) (dismissing argument that
coercion to maintain price levels is not illegal when conspiracy is vertical), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 823 (1985). The lower court cases grappling with the vertical conspiracy issue
after Monsanto are collected in Flynn, supra note 1, at 1104-12. See also John R. Allison,
Complaining Dealers, the Terminated Price Cutter, and Sherman Act Conspiracy Doctrine,
22 Am. Bus. L.J. 467, 486-501 (1985). For an argument that, assuming the economic
efficiency theory is used, coercion ought to play a role in finding a vertical conspiracy, see
Burns, supra note 18, at 405-14.
Coercion also continues to play a role in tying cases, but not because coercion of a
dealer by itself is actionable. See supra note 71. Rather, evidence of coercion in tying
cases is used to show linkage of two products, see Austin, supra note 45, at 1156-68; John
H. Matheson, Class Action Tying Cases: A Framework for Certification Decisions, 76 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 855, 866-73 (1982); power in the tying market, see Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Hovenkamp, supra note 29, § 8.10 at 238-39; or
injury to the buyer, see Hovenkamp, supra note 45, at 226. For an argument that coer-
cion can still play some role in tying cases, even assuming an economic efficiency ap-
proach, see Burns, supra note 18, at 426-31.
86. See Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 71 (defendants have won over 90% of rule of
reason decisions in vertical nonprice cases after Sylvania); John B. McArthur & Thomas
W. Paterson, The Effects of Monsanto, Matsushita, and Sharp on the Plaintiff's Incentive
to Sue, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 333, 343-47 (1991) (fewer vertical cases are likely to be brought
after Monsanto and Sharp); Roszkowski, supra note 74, at 183-86 (after Monsanto most
plaintiff dealers lose on summary judgment or directed verdict). Maxwell Blecher
summed up the attitude of the plaintiffs' bar when he said that when dealers come to his
office with prospective vertical restraint cases, "we give them a cold cup of coffee, validate
their parking, and get them out pretty quickly." ABA Antitrust Spring Meeting Focuses
on Federal, State, Foreign Enforcement, [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1512, at 533 (Apr. 18, 1991). The lower court cases following Monsanto and Sharp
are described in Correia, supra note 53, at 204-07. During the 1980s, Department of
Justice cases involving vertical restraints were similarly rare. See Baxter, supra note 6, at
697-98 (arguing that the DOJ should prosecute vertical cases only when there is likely
collusion and effect in the horizontal interbrand market). Recently, however, the Depart-
ment of Justice and the FTC have brought some vertical resale price maintenance cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Canstar Sports USA, Inc., [1993 CCH 7 Trade Reg. Rep.]
50,746, 70,372 (D. Vt. Sept. 17, 1993) (sports product manufacturer ordered to refrain
from resale price fixing of hockey skates); The Keds Corp., [1993 CCH Trade Reg. Rep.]
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II. THE INCOMPLETENESS OF THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
APPROACH
While the economic efficiency approach has eliminated from the anti-
trust calculus all consideration of the various concerns centering on the
dealer's, apart from the consumer's, well being, the identical dealer-fair-
ness issues continue to surface in a variety of contexts and legal theories
outside of antitrust. This is not to say that there has been a wholesale
rejection of the economic efficiency theory or a blanket adoption of rules
outlawing coercive or unethical business dealing. Rather, what is emerg-
ing, in a number of areas outside of antitrust, are detailed, case-by-case
inquiries into vertical restraints. Typically, among the factors considered
are business ethics and the general fairness of the transaction for the
dealer. In other words, courts are considering (and, in some cases, offer-
ing legal protection for) the very concerns that economic efficiency elimi-
nated from the antitrust analysis of vertical restraints.
A detailed analysis of each of the statutory and common law remedies
that currently address issues of fairness in vertical transactions is beyond
the scope of this Article. 7 A brief overview of the general areas will
suffice to show the pattern that is developing.
As a statutory matter, probably nowhere are fairness concerns more
directly considered than in the state franchise and dealer laws, some of
23,463, 11,993 (proposed consent order under which shoe manufacturer agrees to pay
$7.2 million and refrain from resale price fixing).
A consumer lawsuit challenging a vertical restraint faces an additional hurdle: the
Illinois Brick bar on indirect-purchaser suits. See supra note 78. Some courts have held
that a consumer can avoid this standing hurdle by naming the dealer as a co-conspirator.
See, e.g., California v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 691 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[I]f
plaintiffs seek to by-pass the rule in Illinois Brick, any theory on which they might rely
would raise ... questions relating to the relationships between the defendants and each of
their.. . retail dealers."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1068 (1984); New York v. Dairylea
Coop., 570 F. Supp. 1213, 1215-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (dismissing state's claim on behalf of
consumers against milk wholesalers, but allowing for repleading pursuant to the rule of
Illinois Brick). As a practical matter, however, most private vertical restraint cases are
brought by dealers. See Salop & White, supra note 80, at 1005 (empirical study showed
that dealers are principal plaintiffs in private vertical cases).
87. The growth of franchising has led to a substantial body of literature focusing on
the rights and liabilities arising out of that relationship. See, e.g., Philip F. Zeidman &
Perry C. Ausbrook, Will the Answers Be Different If the Seller-Buyer Relationship Is a
Franchise?, in Legal Aspects of Selling & Buying, 404 (Philip F. Zeidman ed., 2d ed.
1991); A.B.A. Antitrust Sec., Monograph No. 17, Franchise Protection: Laws Against
Termination and the Establishment of Additional Franchises (1990) [hereinafter Mono-
graph No. 17]; Jill M. Aubin, Franchise Tie-Ins: The State of the Law, 26 New Eng. L
Rev. 1 (1991); Ernest A. Braun, Policy Issues of Franchising, 14 Sw. U. L. Rev. 155
(1984); Harold Brown, Franchising: Fraud, Concealment and Full Disclosure, 33 Ohio St.
L.J. 517 (1972); Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 927 (1990); Donald P. Horwitz & Walter M.
Volpi, Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 54 St. John's L. Rev. 217 (1980); James B.
Kobak, Jr., Significant Factors in the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 32 N.Y.L Sch.
L. Rev. 795 (1987); Michael J. Lockerby, Franchise Termination Restrictions: A Guide
For Practitioners and Policy Makers, 30 Antitrust Bull. 791 (1985); Thomas M. Pitegoff,
Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, 45 Bus. Law. 289 (1989).
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which apply to specific industries (such as automobile or liquor distribu-
torships)88 and some of which apply to all franchises. 89 There is, for the
most part, no cause-and-effect relationship between the enactment of
these state laws and the elimination of fairness concerns from antitrust.
The bulk of the state franchise statutes were passed during the 1970s, 90
when most courts were willing to consider at least some fairness factors
in analyzing vertical restraints under the antitrust laws.9' The continued
interest in such laws is seen in Iowa's 1992 enactment of a franchise law92
88. Several states have enacted "industry specific" statutes for particular industries,
such as automobiles, alcoholic beverages, farm equipment and petroleum. See Mono-
graph No. 17, supra note 87, at 15-17. For a discussion of these state statutes, see A.B.A.
Antitrust Sec., Monograph No. 9, Refusals to Deal and Exclusive Distributorship App. B
at 58-59 (1983) [hereinafter Monograph No. 9] (state automobile franchise acts); Michael
M. Eaton, State Regulation of Franchise and Dealership Terminations: An Overview, 49
Antitrust L.J. 1331 (1980); Richard L. Smith II, Franchise Regulation: An Economic
Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & Econ. 125 (1982)
(giving a detailed economic analysis of state automobile laws and arguing that many state
regulations are economically unsound). Lists of the various industry-specific statutes are
found in Legal Aspects of Selling & Buying, supra note 87, at 645-46, 649-50, 653-56. On
the federal level, the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225
(1988), and Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1988), protect
automobile and gasoline dealers, respectively.
89. State franchise laws are currently in place in at least 17 states, Puerto Rico and
the Virgin Islands. See Monograph No. 17, supra note 87, at 17 n.73; Pitegoff, supra note
87, at 321, and in Legal Aspects of Buying and Selling, supra note 87, at 651. See also
1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 2362 (West) (most recent franchise statute discussed further,
see infra note 92).
Even among the laws geared to all franchises, the definition of a "franchise" varies
from state to state. For reviews of the various approaches to defining "franchise," see
Allen S. Joslyn, Legislative Definitions of the Franchise Relationship, 32 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 779 (1987); Lockerby, supra note 87, at 803-04, 840-43; Pitegoff, supra note 87, at
292-96; Zeidman & Ausbrook, supra note 87, §§ 9.28-9.34. A key aspect of most
franchises is an identifiable brand or trade name for the product or service. See James A.
Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form, The Case of Franchis-
ing, 18 J. Fin. Econ. 401, 403 (1987); Goldberg, supra note 53, at 746; Mathewson &
Winter, supra note 55, at 504.
90. See James A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination
Laws, 34 J.L. & Econ. 101, 115 (1991). For a history of the development of franchising
and the franchise-protection statutes, see Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 290-92.
91. See supra notes 40 and 42 and accompanying text.
92. See 1992 Iowa Legis. Serv. 2362 (West). In May 1993, the Iowa statute was held
unconstitutional to the extent it interferes with pre-existing franchise contracts. See Mc-
Donald's Corp. v. Nelson, 822 F. Supp. 597, 609 (S.D. Iowa 1993). Nineteen other states
are reported to be "seriously" considering such legislation, and some franchise experts
predict that the Iowa statute might serve as a model. Richard S. Gibson, McDonald's Is
Challenging Iowa's New Franchise Law, Wall St. J., May 14, 1992, at B2; Kirk Victor,
Franchising Fracas, 24 Nat'l J., 2184, 2188 (1992). The International Franchise Associa-
tion (IFA) recently adopted a new code of ethics which requires franchisors to act in
good faith toward franchisees. See IFA Board Adopts New Code of Ethics, [July-Dec.] 63
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1592, 664-65 (Nov. 26, 1992). The IFA is
promoting the idea of self-regulation "[i]n hopes of reducing the mounting pressure for
new state and federal legal curbs on their industry." Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, Franchisees
Weigh Joint Action to Gain Protections, Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1992, at B2. Some attorneys
who represent franchisees dismiss the IFA code as an inadequate response and "toothless
commandments [that] cannot be taken seriously by any franchisor." Most Witnesses Urge
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and Congress' recent consideration of similar legislation on a federal
level.93
Substantively, the protection offered by the state franchise and dealer
laws is often broader than that offered by the early antitrust vertical re-
straint case law. While the specifics of the legislation vary from state to
state, typically these laws protect the franchisee at two distinct times: (1)
when the franchisee purchases the franchise, and (2) during the ongoing
course of the franchise relationship. 94 The first type of protection, about
which there is little controversy,95 is handled by requiring the franchisor
to make certain disclosures to prospective franchisees. 96 The second, and
more controversial and far-reaching protection, is handled in various
Further Litigation of Franchisor Franchisee Relationship, [Jan-June] 64 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1612 at 500 (Apr. 29, 1993).
93. In July 1993, three bills were introduced into Congress to regulate franchises.
One, H.R. 2593, would establish minimum standards of fair conduct in ongoing franchise
relationships. The other two bills, H.R. 2595 and H.R. 2596, would regulate disclosures
required in connection with the sale of franchises and provide consumers with statistical
information about franchises. See Bills Introduced, [July-Dec.] 65 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1622, at 88 (July 8, 1993). The bills are reported to have broad-
based, bipartisan support. See Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, Support Grows in Congress for
New Franchise Laws, Wall St. J., July 9, 1993, at B2. Similar bills were introduced in
1992. H.R. 5232 and H.R. 5233, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). For a discussion of earlier
proposed federal legislation, see Braun, supra note 87, at 213-14; Lockerby, supra note 87,
at 802. Rep. John J. LaFalce, Chairman of the House Small Business Committee and a
principal proponent of this legislation, likens the franchise bills "to what was done to
bring about fair dealing between labor and management in the '30s." Victor, supra note
92, at 2185.
94. For a discussion of franchising in general and the typical franchise contract, see
Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 292-95; Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Struc-
ture of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & Econ. 223, 224-28 (1978). In 1990 franchising
outlets accounted for over one-third of all U.S. retail outlets, and some expect the number
to grow to 50% by the year 2000. See Franchising in the U.S. Economy: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Small Business, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 97-98 (1990).
95. Even those commentators critical of the state statutes regulating ongoing
franchise relationships typically support the disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Braun,
supra note 87, at 211 (full disclosure legislation received practically unanimous support
from all concerned, including franchisors); Brickley et al., supra note 90, at I 11; Pitegoff,
supra note 87, at 314-15. The new IFA code of ethics also contains a disclosure require-
ment. See supra note 92, at 664.
96. See Kobak, supra note 87, at 812-13 (reviewing state statutes). The Federal Trade
Commission has also promulgated a rule requiring that franchisors make certain disclo-
sures to prospective franchisees. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.1 (1992) (listing information that
franchisor or franchise broker must provide to prospective franchisees). For a discussion
of the FTC rule, see Braun, supra note 87, at 206-08; Kobak, supra note 87, at 813-14;
Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 291. Some franchisees complain that franchisor deception is
rising and that the FTC has been lax in its enforcement of its disclosure rule. See Jeffrey
A. Tannenbaum, Angry Franchisees Turn Spotlight to FTC Enforcement, Wall St. J., Oct.
13, 1992, at B2. A recent report of the General Accounting Office supports this view; the
GAO found the FTC to be a slow and infrequent enforcer of its franchise rules. See
General Accounting Office Report: FTC Franchise Rule Enforcement, 163 Bus.
Franchise Guide (CCH) July 23, 1993 (Supp.).
Some states guarantee pre-sale disclosures by including sales of franchises in their de-
ceptive trade practices statutes which typically provide a buyer with a cause of action in
case of a misstatement of facts in connection with the sale of goods or services. See, eg.,
19931
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ways. Typically, the state laws require that the franchisor have good
cause to terminate a franchisee 97 or to fail to renew the franchise. 98
Some limit a franchisor's ability to change substantially the terms of the
franchise.99 Some limit the franchisor's ability to encroach on a fran-
chisee's exclusive territory, impose arbitrary standards, or tie the
purchase of supplies to the franchise trademark. 100 Many statutes set out
procedural requirements (such as notice and time to cure) for termina-
tion or nonrenewal.10
Running throughout all of these statutes is a concern for the franchisee
or dealer as opposed to the more general consuming public. The laws
project a view of the franchisee as being in an unequal bargaining posi-
tion vis-a-vis the franchisor. 102 Specifically, these laws seek to protect the
Ala. Code § 8-19-3(3) (1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01(A) (Anderson Supp.
1992); Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605(7) (1992); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-103(2) (1988).
97. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-5 (West 1989); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 135.03 (West
1989). Different statutes use slightly different terminology, including "cause," "due
cause," "good cause," "reasonable cause," and not "unjust." For a discussion of the
individual statutory standards and judicial interpretations of those standards, see Pitegoff,
supra note 87, at 296-98, 323-24; Zeidman & Ausbrook, supra note 87, § 9.63. Even
those states using the term "good cause" may define it slightly differently. Compare Ark.
Code Ann. § 4-72-202(7) (Michie 1991) (listing eight examples of "good cause") with
Ind. Code Ann. § 23-2-2.7-1(7) (Bums 1989) ("good cause ... includes any material
violation" of agreement). The new IFA code of ethics provides that a franchisee can only
be terminated for good cause unless both parties have a contractual right to terminate
without cause. See supra, note 92, at 664.
98. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2552(b) (1974); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 482E-6(2)(H)
(1985); Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 301.
99. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 23-2-2.7-1(3) (Bums 1989); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 135.03
(West 1989).
100. See, e.g. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-406(5) (1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 19.100.180(2)(h) (West Supp. 1993). See Kobak, supra note 87, at 806 (collecting state
statutes prohibiting arbitrary standards of conduct); Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 307, 329-
31 (collecting examples of unlawful practices). See also Aubin, supra note 87, at 4 (dis-
cussing how unscrupulous franchisor can increase its profits through unreasonable tie-in);
Brickley & Dark, supra note 89, at 406-07 (franchisor can exact unfair quasi-rents from
franchisee by demanding higher franchise fees after franchisee has invested in expensive
items that do not have other uses).
101. The required notice for termination typically ranges from 30 days to 90 days. See,
e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 20020 (West 1987) (30 days notice necessary for termina-
tion); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.405 (1990) (90 days notice necessary for termination). The
rationale is to provide the franchisee a reasonable amount of time to recoup her invest-
ment. For listings of specific state statutes, see Kobak, supra note 87, at 804-05; Pitegoff,
supra note 87, at 325-28. The new IFA code of ethics requires 30 days notice for termi-
nation and 180 days notice for nonrenewal. See supra note 92, at 664.
102. See Andrew A. Caffey, Franchise Termination and Nonrenewal Legislation: Re-
cent Developments and Trends in State Legislation, 49 Antitrust L.J. 1343 (1980); Lock-
erby, supra note 87, at 831-34; Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 289. See also Va. Code Ann.
§ 13.1-558 (Michie 1993) (policy of state law "to correct ... such inequities as may exist
in the franchise system so as to establish a more even balance of power between
franchisors and franchisees; ... to deal fairly with their franchisees with reference to all
aspects of the franchise relationship"); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 135.025(2)(b) (West 1989) (pur-
poses of state law include "protect[ing] dealers against unfair treatment by [suppliers],
who inherently have superior economic power and superior bargaining power in the ne-
gotiation of dealerships").
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franchisee, who has invested time, money, and energy into developing a
business,"°3 from unfair termination (or the threat of termination),"10
overreaching, and arbitrary or unethical business practices by an unscru-
pulous franchisor.'0 s Notably absent from the typical franchise law is
any reference to the market share of the franchisor, interbrand competi-
tion, or economic efficiency. Rather these laws focus simply on the two-
party franchisor-franchisee relationship 0 6 with the implicit assumption
that society as a whole will be better off if the franchisee is protected."°
In applying these statutes, however, courts have not simply granted
103. In building up her business, the franchisee promotes the franchisor's interests
(both by promoting the franchisor's name and through royalties) as well as her own. See
Braun, supra note 87, at 212-13; Rubin, supra note 94, at 226-27.
104. See Lockerby, supra note 87, at 834-36 ("A concern... is that franchisors will
terminate arbitrarily, unfairly capitalizing on goodwill built up by their franchisees.").
Even absent actual termination, franchisee may fear threat of termination.
105. See Braun, supra note 87, at 213; Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 307. The New Jersey
statute, for instance, seeks to "rule out arbitrary and capricious cancellation of franchises
while preserving the right of franchisors to safeguard their interests through the applica-
tion of clear and nondiscriminatory standards." Carlos v. Philips Business Sys., Inc., 556
F. Supp. 769, 775 (E.D.N.Y.); aff'd, 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Assembly Bill
2063 (1971)). See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-1501 (Supp. 1993) (legislative intent to
provide "uniform rights and procedures to prevent arbitrary and capricious business
practices by franchisors").
106. Similarly, the aim of the federal dealer acts, supra note 88, is protection of the
dealer from coercive and unfair acts of the supplier. The Automobile Dealer's Day in
Court Act imposes on a supplier a duty of good faith "in performing or complying with
any of the terms ... of [a dealer's] franchise, or in terminating, canceling, or not renewing
the franchise." 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1988). "Good faith" is defined as acting "in a fair and
equitable manner... so as to guarantee... freedom from coercion, intimidation, or
threats of coercion or intimidation.... ." Ial § 122 1(e). The primary motivation behind
the act "was to address ... perceived ... inequality in bargaining power between the
automobile manufacturers and their... dealers, and to address the concern... with the
increase in the concentration of economic power such that traditional contractual con-
cepts no longer afforded adequate protections for the dealer." Monograph No. 9, supra
note 88, App. B at 58. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1078-79 (the federal Automobile
Dealer Franchise Act is an example of society's concern with the noneconomic compo-
nents of antitrust policy). The PMPA lists the grounds on which a franchise may be
terminated or not renewed. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b) (1988). For a discussion of the PMPA
standards, see William R. O'Brien, Federal Laws Affecting the Right of a Franchisor to
Terminate or Not Renew a Franchise: Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 49 Antitrust
L.J. 1371, 1371 (1980) ("The stated purpose of the [PMPA] is to protect the interests of
franchisees and to balance the perceived unequal bargaining power between dealers and
their suppliers," while at the same time "recogniz[ing] the franchisor's right to terminate
or not renew where the circumstances justify ...."). Bills were introduced in the 102d
Congress to provide even greater protection for the gasoline retailers. Reports on Petro-
leum Marketing Bills Maintain Inadequacies in Current Law, Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1585, at 457-58 (Oct. 8, 1992); Compromise Bill Is Developed to Amend
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1585, at
458-59 (Oct. 8, 1992), and reintroduced in the 103d Congress. See House Bill is Reintro-
duced on Gasoline Franchise Relationship, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1609, at 403 (Apr. 8, 1993).
107. Frequently the state franchise laws refer to the public interest in promoting fair-
ness for dealers. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:10-2 (West 1989) ("distribution and sales
through franchise arrangements ... vitally affects ... the public interest and the public
welfare[ ]"); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 135.025(2)(a) (West 1989) (a purpose of the act is "[tlo
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relief to any and all disgruntled franchisees and dealers. 0 What is nota-
ble about the judicial decisions is the willingness of the courts to engage
in detailed, factual inquiries and to balance the franchisee's need for fair-
ness with the franchisor's need to make marketing decisions for a uni-
form product or service." In doing so, the courts tend to consider some
of the very factors that had often been considered in antitrust before the
ascendancy of the economic efficiency approach." 0
Thus courts consider such matters as: the type of franchise and regu-
lation involved;' 1 ' the reason for, scope, and effect of any substantial
change in the terms of the franchise;112 the success or failure of the fran-
promote the compelling interest of the public in fair business relations between dealers
and grantors, and in the continuation of dealerships on a fair basis").
108. For a discussion of the case law under the state franchise acts, see Pitegoff, supra
note 87, at 297-307; Zeidman & Ausbrook, supra note 87, §§ 9.62-9.64. One commenta-
tor who reviewed judicial decisions under the state franchise statutes concluded that "[a]
trend appears to be emerging to construe the coverage of the franchise relationship laws
narrowly." Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 318.
109. Similarly, while certainly not granting redress to any and all dealers, courts have
engaged in the same sort of detailed factual reviews in applying the federal dealer laws.
See, e.g., Empire Volkswagen Inc. v. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 814 F.2d 90 (2d
Cir. 1987) (court reviews in detail the agreements between manufacturer and automobile
dealer concerning dealer's facility); Autohaus Brugger, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 567
F.2d 901 (9th Cir.) (court reviews in detail automobile dealer's allegation of improper
warranty reimbursements), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978). At the same time, courts
have interpreted the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act as requiring proof of coer-
cion. See Minson Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 554 F.2d 1266, 1267 (4th
Cir. 1977); Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510, 514
(10th Cir. 1976). Dealer relief under the PMPA has similarly been restricted by judicial
interpretations permitting supplier imposition of any restrictions motivated by the sup-
plier's business judgment. See, e.g., Hinkleman v. Shell Oil Co., 962 F.2d 372, 376 (4th
Cir.) (no violation where termination due to dealer's failure to make timely payments),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 831 (1992); Riddle v. Mobile Oil Corp., No. 86-1636-CIV-T-17a,
1992 WL 81321 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 1992) (upholding hours of operation); Malone v.
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 474 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1979) (upholding sales quota).
For a discussion of the case law under the automobile act, see Monograph No. 9, supra
note 88, at app. B at 52-58; John A. Donovan, Federal Laws Affecting the Right of a
Franchisor to Terminate or Not Renew a Franchise: Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act,
49 Antitrust L.J. 1353 (1980); Lockerby, supra note 87, at 793-98. The case law under
the PMPA is summarized in Monograph No. 9, supra note 88, App. C at 60-64.
110. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. Prior to the ascendancy of the
economic efficiency approach, the rule of reason in antitrust law was a far-reaching in-
quiry into "the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condi-
tion before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint .... the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained .... Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918). For a historical review of the rule of reason in antitrust, see Ru-
dolph J. Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of
Competition, 40 Hastings L.J. 285 (1989).
111. See, e.g., Deutchland Enters., Ltd. v. Burger King Corp., 957 F.2d 449, 453 (7th
Cir. 1992) (court considers whether contract provision barring franchisee from having an
interest in a "same or similar" business is essential and reasonable under the
circumstances).
112. See, e.g., Draft-Line Corp. v. Hon Co., 781 F. Supp. 841, 844 (D.P.R. 1991) (state
franchise act applies where manufacturer establishes parallel dealerships in area which
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chisee in meeting reasonable expectations; '13 the notice, if any, that the
franchisee had of any unwritten policies of the franchisor;', 4 the motive
behind and evenhandedness of the franchisor's actions;' 5 the fran-
chisee's violation of the franchise agreement or the reasonable expecta-
tions of the franchisor; "6 the franchisor's withdrawal from the market or
substitution of its own stores. 11 7 The upshot is that some franchisees are
had formerly been exclusive dealership), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1046 (1st Cir. 1993); Carlos v.
Philips Business Sys., 556 F. Supp. 769, 776 (E.D.N.Y.) (change in dealership terms,
from exclusive distributor to nonexclusive dealer, can be "termination" for purposes of
state franchise act), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir. 1983); Ziegler Co., Inc. v. Rexnord,
Inc., 433 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Wis. 1988) (jury trial necessary to determine whether change in
dealership terms was essential, reasonable and nondiscriminatory).
113. See, ,,g., Reinders Bros., Inc. v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44, 50-51 (7th
Cir. 1980) (trial necessary to determine whether termination was proper because dealer
failed to use "best efforts" to sell manufacturer's product or whether this was simply a
pretextual reason given by manufacturer).
114. See, eg., Power Draulics-Nielsen, Inc. v. Libbey Owens-Ford Co., [1987-89
Transfer Binder] Bus. Fran. Guide (CCH) 9075 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (trial necessary to
determine extent to which dealer violated manufacturer's unwritten policy regarding
sales of competing goods and extent to which manufacturer generally enforced its unwrit-
ten policy).
115. See, eg. East Bay Running Store, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 890 F.2d 996, 1000 (7th Cir.
1989) (no violation of state franchise act where supplier's new policy regarding telephone
and mail orders was a system-wide, nondiscriminatory change applicable to all dealers,
was supported by a business reason, and did not affect the dealer's marketing of other
Nike products); Reinders Bros., 627 F.2d at 50-51 (trial necessary to determine whether
termination was proper because dealer failed to use "best efforts" to sell manufacturer's
product or whether this was simply a pretextual reason given by manufacturer); J.I. Case
Co. v. Early's, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (manufacturer entitled to
summary judgment on state franchise act claim where dealer failed to install computer
required by manufacturer and manufacturer showed that requirement was applicable to
all dealers and was supported by a good business reason).
116. See, eg., Deutchland Enters., Ltd. v. Burger King Corp., 957 F.2d 449, 453 (7th
Cir. 1992) (manufacturer entitled to summary judgment on state franchise act claim
where franchisee violated franchise contract provision which the manufacturer showed
was essential and reasonable); Brattleboro Auto Sales, Inc. v. Subaru of New England,
Inc., 633 F.2d 649, 651-52 (2d Cir. 1980) (manufacturer did not violate state automobile
dealer act in terminating dealer, where manufacturer showed it reasonably concluded
that dealer's addition of three more car lines would result in poor sales and service of the
manufacturer's product); An-Port, Inc. v. MBR Indus., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1301, 1314
(D.P.R. 1991) (manufacturer entitled to summary judgment on dealer act claim where
dealer had violated oral contract with the manufacturer by selling goods that were in
direct competition with those of the manufacturer and mislabeling some of those goods).
117. See, e.g., Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 136-39 (7th Cir.
1990) (supplier violated state franchise law where it replaced national distributors with
regional distributors; supplier's internal economic reasons were not, by themselves, "good
cause" for termination or nonrenewal); Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Servs., Inc. v.
Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1985) (dealers entitled to damages under
state franchise law where supplier terminated all dealers to replace them with company-
owned stores); Slowiak v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) r 69821 (W.D.
Wis. 1992) (trial necessary to determine whether change in distribution systems was
made for good cause where supplier is not withdrawing from marketplace), aff'd without
opinion, 987 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1993); Lee Beverage Co., Inc. v. I.S.C. Wines of Cal.,
Inc., 623 F. Supp. 867, 871 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (supplier has no liability under state
franchise act where it ceased selling product line altogether); St. Joseph Equip. v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1245, 1246-47 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (no violation of state
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able to obtain relief, or at least a review of the facts, in circumstances that
would likely not result in relief under current antitrust jurisprudence. "18
Even apart from legislation specifically directed to dealers, courts are
finding a variety of ways to review the fairness of a supplier's restraints
on, and actions toward, his dealer. For instance, some courts utilize state
unfair trade practices statutes to resolve supplier-dealer disputes even
though, typically, these laws do not directly apply to such relation-
ships.' 9 Dealers have also been successful under a number of common
franchise law where supplier completely withdraws from geographic market); United
States Surgical Corp. v. Oregon Medical & Surgical Specialties, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 68, 72
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (summary judgment for manufacturer on state franchise act claim where
manufacturer was not renewing any dealerships). See Kobak, supra note 87, at 799-801
(collecting cases on dealer termination where supplier leaves market or changes mode of
distribution).
118. For example, courts have stated that franchisees are entitled to relief (or at least a
trial) under franchise laws where the franchisee is terminated for a reason not specified in
the franchise contract, see Kawasaki Shop of Aurora, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.,
544 N.E.2d 457 (Ill. 1989), appeal denied, 550 N.E.2d 556 (1990); the franchisor termi-
nates the franchisee in order to establish company-owned stores, see Kealey Pharmacy &
Home Care Servs., Inc. v. Walgreen Co., 761 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1985); the franchisor
uses an unfair tying arrangement for supplies, see Nelson v. National Fund Raising Con-
sultants, Inc., 842 P.2d 473 (Wash. 1992); the franchisor is unable to show the franchisee
violated a written or unwritten policy, see Power Draulics-Nielsen, Inc. v. Libbey Owens-
Ford Co., [1987-89 Transfer Binder] Bus. Fran. Guide (CCH) 9075 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
the franchisor's own actions allegedly made it impossible for the franchisee to expand to
meet marketing needs, see Draft-Line Corp. v. Hon Co., 781 F. Supp. 841 (D.P.R. 1991),
aff'd, 983 F.2d 1046 (1st Cir. 1993); the franchisor breached a promise to give the fran-
chisee an exclusive sales territory, see Freiburg Farm Equip., Inc. v. Van Dale, Inc., 978
F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1992). In some instances, relief is specifically denied under the anti-
trust laws but the dealer is permitted to proceed with a state franchise act claim. See, e.g.,
Slowiak v. Hudson Foods, Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas.(CCH) % 69821 (W.D. Wis. 1992),
aff'd without opinion, 987 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1993); Power Draulics-Nielsen v. Libbey
Owens-Ford Co., [1987-89 Transfer Binder] Bus. Fran. Guide (CCH) 9075 (S.D.N.Y.
1988); Carlo C. Gelardi Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 502 F. Supp. 637 (D.N.J. 1980) (no
violation of federal antitrust laws, but possible violation of the New Jersey Franchise
Practices Act).
119. See, e.g., Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207, 1218-20 (4th
Cir.) (distributor stated cause of action under state unfair trade practices act where it
alleged nonrenewal of its distributorship was unfair), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983);
Chem-Tek, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 816 F. Supp. 123, 130 (D. Conn. 1993) (dis-
tributor stated cause of action under state unfair trade practices act where it alleged ter-
mination without cause and tortious interference with its contracts with customers);
Globe Distribs., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co. (In re Globe Distribs., Inc.), 129 B.R. 304
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (terminated distributor able to use state consumer protection act
to recover double its actual damages); Nelson v. National Fund Raising Consultants,
Inc., 842 P.2d 473, 478 (Wash. 1992) (charging franchisee more than reasonable price for
products may violate state consumer protection act); Owens v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of
Hickory, N.C., Inc., 381 S.E.2d 819, 823-24 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (state unfair trade
practices act prohibits attempts to fix resale prices), modified, 412 S.E.2d 636 (N.C.
1992). On the other hand, some courts have interpreted the substantive coverage of these
state acts to be identical to the federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Red Diamond Supply,
Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1007-08 (5th Cir.) (due to similarity, court
looked to federal law to interpret state statute), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); Ben
Elfman & Son, Inc. v. Criterion Mills, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 683, 687 (D. Mass. 1991) (plain-
tiff's failure to show antitrust violation precludes finding of impropriety required for tor-
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law theories. 20 These theories include breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing,121 tortious interference with contract,t 22 eq-
uitable estoppel, 12 3 breach of an oral contract, 124 and breach of fiduciary
duty.12
5
tious interference of contract). For a state-by-state survey of suits by businesses under
these state acts, see G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards for Common Law
Rules in Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1198,
1214-35 (1988). See also Martin Loeber, Note, A DTPA Cause of Action for the Termi-
nated or Nonrenewed Franchisee: A Jack in the Box for the Unfair Franchisor, 43 Baylor
L. Rev. 809 (1991) (arguing that a terminated franchisee should have standing under the
Texas Deceptive Practices Act to assert a claim against a franchisor for unconscionable
conduct).
120. For a discussion of the various common law theories, see Ernest Gellhorn, Limi-
tations on Contract Termination Rights"-Franchise Cancellations, 1967 Duke LJ. 465,
483-505; Kobak, supra note 87, at 801-03, 807-10; Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 308-14; Lois
A. White, The Applicability of Common Law, 32 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 819 (1987).
121. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727-29 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); In re Burger Chef Franchise Litig., [1987-89 Transfer
Binder] Bus. Franch. Guide (CCH) 9072 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins,
Inc., 720 P.2d 1148, 1152-53 (Mont. 1986); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d
736, 742 (Pa. 1978); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433, 440 (V. Va. 1976).
This theory is often used by courts in determining the intention of the parties when the
contract is silent on a given point. Cases utilizing this theory are collected in Lockerby,
supra note 87, at 824-30; Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 308 & nn. 83-85; White, supra note
120, at 825-26; Zeidman & Ausbrook, supra note 87, § 9.74. The use of fairness and
unconscionability doctrines in connection with gasoline dealers is discussed in Ellen R.
Jordan, Unconscionability at the Gas Station, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 813 (1978). On the re-
lated issue of the franchisor's implied duty to provide competent guidance and assistance
to its franchisees, see Robert T. Joseph, Do Franchisors Owe a Duty of Competence?, 46
Bus. Law. 471 (1991). A bill has been introduced in the New York legislature to require
franchisors, at minimum, "to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by
franchisers in good standing in similar communities or trade areas." Jeffrey A. Tannen-
baum, New York Lawmaker Seeks to Keep Franchisers Smart, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1992,
at B2 (quoting Assemblyman I. William Blanchi's proposed Fair Franchising Act).
122. See, e.g., American Business Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 798 F.2d 1135,
1142-46 (8th Cir. 1986); Machine Maintenance & Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 661
F. Supp. 1112, 115-17 (E.D. Mo. 1987); Zimmer-Masiello, Inc. v. Zimmer, Inc., 552
N.Y.S.2d 935, 937 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal dismissed, 559 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1990).
123. See, eg., Chem-Tek, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 816 F. Supp. 123, 131 (D.
Conn. 1993); Miskimen v. Kansas City Star Co., 684 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
Some courts will impose a right of recoupment under which the dealer must be given a
reasonable time to recoup her investment. See, eg., Ernst v. Ford Motor Co., 813 S.W.2d
910, 918-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
124. See, eg., Lano Equip., Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 399 N.W.2d 694 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987); A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 144 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1957). The franchisor's
breach of a written contractual provision is also a common basis for suit by franchisees.
See, eg., Sir Speedy, Inc. v. L & P Graphics, Inc., 957 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1992)
(franchisor breached contractual obligations to provide services and assistance). Such
lawsuits, however, are simply applications of standard contract law and do not typically
involve inquiries into fairness or good faith.
125. Of the various common law theories, this one has probably been the least success-
ful for dealers as most courts reject the notion that a supplier has a fiduciary duty toward
its dealer. See, e.g., Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 485
(5th Cir. 1984); Murphy v. White Hen Pantry Co., 691 F.2d 350, 354-56 (7th Cir. 1982).
Cases are collected at Lockerby, supra note 87, at 812-17; Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 308
n.83; Zeidman & Ausbrook, supra note 87, § 9.73. The use of a fiduciary theory is criti-
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As with the state franchise acts, use of one or more of these theories
does not automatically mean that the dealer wins. It does, however,
often lead to a factual inquiry into the particular vertical arrangement
with an eye toward protecting the dealer from the supplier's overreach-
ing or unethical practices.126 Courts have, for instance, granted relief or
at least ordered trials where there are allegations that: the supplier tried
to solicit the dealer's customers or move customers to another dealer; 27
the supplier attempted to dictate resale prices, restrict price advertising,
or impose territorial restrictions; 128 the supplier attempted to change
substantially the terms of the dealer's contract; 29 the supplier failed to
cized by Braun, supra note 87, at 228-30. But see Zimmer-Masiello, Inc. v. Zimmer, Inc.,
552 N.Y.S.2d 935, 936-37 (App. Div.) (dealer stated cause of action for breach of fiduci-
ary duty where manufacturer maintained position of dominance and imposed various
vertical restraints on dealer), appeal dismissed, 559 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1990).
126. Some commentators have criticized the use of these common law theories on both
doctrinal and practical grounds. See Braun, supra note 87, at 228-30; Jordan, supra note
121, at 839-43; Lockerby, supra note 87, at 851-57.
127. See Western Fireproofing Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 896 F.2d 286, 291 (8th Cir.
1990) (affirming jury award for licensee on theory of tortious interference with contract
where supplier provided preferential pricing to other licensees and attempted to move
customer from plaintiff to other licensees); Chem-Tek, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 816
F. Supp. 123, 130 (D. Conn. 1993) (finding dealer entitled to trial on claim that supplier
made intentional misrepresentations to dealer's customers); Machine Maintenance &
Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1112, 1116-17 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (supplier
tortiously interfered with dealer's contracts with its customers by trying to move custom-
ers to another dealer); Integrated Micro Sys., Inc. v. NEC Home Elecs. (U.S.A.), 329
S.E.2d 554, 558-59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (dealer entitled to trial on claim that supplier
interfered with dealer's business relations with customer by giving customer false infor-
mation about dealer in attempt to obtain customer's business for itself); Zimmer-
Masiello, Inc. v. Zimmer, Inc., 552 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937-38 (N.Y. App. Div.) (dealer stated
cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference with contract where
supplier began selling directly to dealer's customers), appeal dismissed, 559 N.E.2d 680
(N.Y. 1990). But see Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 F.2d 1419, 1423 (5th Cir. 1993)
(no violation of state unfair trade practices act where supplier called on nonexclusive
dealer's customers in attempt to increase sagging sales and invited the dealer to partici-
pate in calls); McKeown Distribs., Inc. v. Gyp-Crete Corp., 618 F. Supp. 632, 644 (D.
Conn. 1985) (no tortious interference with contract where supplier contacted dealer's
customers after lawful termination).
128. See Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc. v. FMG of Kansas City, Inc., 819 F.2d 1279,
1284 (4th Cir. 1987) (affirming jury award for franchisee on theory of implied duty of
good faith where supplier had, inter alia, restricted price advertisements and returns of
merchandise), overruled by, Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990);
Lano Equip., Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 399 N.W.2d 694, 695-99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(affirming trial court's grant of temporary restraining order prohibiting termination of
dealer where supplier breached oral agreement by imposing restrictive sales territories);
Dunfee v. Baskin-Robbins, Inc., 720 P.2d 1148, 1154 (Mont. 1986) (affirming jury award
for franchisee on theory of implied duty of good faith where franchisor unreasonably
refused franchisee's relocation request); Owens v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 381 S.E.2d
819, 823-24 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (store owner stated cause of action under state unfair
trade practices act where supplier attempted (unsuccessfully) to impose resale prices on
store and to limit customers), modified, 412 S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 1992). In Zimmer-
Masiello, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 936-37, the existence of various vertical price and nonprice
restraints were, in part, the basis for implying a fiduciary relationship between the sup-
plier and the dealer.
129. See Entre Computer Ctrs., 819 F.2d at 1284 (affirming jury award for franchisees
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give the dealer necessary support during the notice-of-termination pe-
riod;13 the supplier saturated the market with company-owned stores in
order to purchase the dealer's outlets at a reduced price;I3 the supplier,
due to complaints from other dealers, made conditions intolerable for the
dealer.1 32
In short, in a variety of areas outside of antitrust, courts are consider-
ing a wide panoply of factors, and not solely economic ones, to insure
fairness and good faith in vertical relationships.' 33 A supplier can cer-
tainly prevail but usually not by showing (as in current antitrust analysis)
that he lacks market power or that his action will ultimately increase
interbrand competition. 134 Rather the supplier's victory is typically due
on theory of implied duty of good faith where supplier, inter alia, discontinued some
product lines without notice, did not ship requested quantities and refused to allow fran-
chisees to return unrequested merchandise); In re Burger Chef Franchise Litig., [1987-89
Transfer Binder] Bus. Franch. Guide (CCH) 9072 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (franchisees enti-
tled to trial on claim of breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing where supplier
allegedly changed delivery service, menu and supplies); Miskimen v. Kansas City Star
Co., 684 S.W.2d 394, 401-02 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (newspaper equitably estopped from
changing independent carriers into delivery agents where contracts were not subject to
negotiation and newspaper had earlier acknowledged carriers' proprietary interests in
routes).
130. See American Business Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 798 F.2d 1135, 1144-46
(8th Cir. 1986) (failure to give pricing information supports dealer's claim of tortious
interference with contract); Machine Maintenance & Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., Inc.,
661 F. Supp. 1112, 1116 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (supplier tortiously interfered with dealer's
contracts with customers by giving inadequate notice of termination, thereby making it
difficult for dealer to obtain alternate supplier, and by actively soliciting dealer's custom-
ers during notice-of-termination period).
131. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1979) (af-
firming damage award for franchisee on theory of implied covenant of good faith where
franchisor saturated market with its own stores in an attempt to reduce value of fran-
chisee's stores which franchisor then sought to purchase), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 917
(1980); see also In re Globe Distribs., Inc., 129 B.R. 304, 317 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991)
(brewer violated duty of good faith and fair dealing and state consumer protection act
when it tried to coerce distributor into selling out to brewer).
132. See Carlo C. Gelardi Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 502 F. Supp. 637, 651 (D.NJ.
1980) (dealer entitled to trial under theory of implied covenant of good faith where sup-
plier allegedly responded to complaints from other dealers by making plaintiff's business
life so miserable that plaintiff was forced to quit); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Razumnic, 390 A.2d 736, 742 (Pa. 1978) (supplier breaches implied covenant of good faith
by terminating dealer arbitrarily).
133. Some commentators argue that the law ought to impose certain minimal rules of
fairness on the franchise relationship. See Braun, supra note 87, at 233-35 (proposing two
rules: (1) neither party may appropriate or capriciously damage the interest of the other,
(2) each party owes other a duty of loyalty including a duty to refrain from violating
other's reasonable expectations); Gellhorn, supra note 120, at 505-21 (doctrine of uncon-
scionability should be expanded to insure fairness in franchise terminations).
134. See eg., Machine Maintenance & Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 661 F. Supp.
1112, 1119 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (denying relief to dealer under antitrust laws because no
showing that supplier had market power or that competition had been reduced, but
granting relief under tortious interference with contract theory). Furthermore, in these
cases, the supplier's marketing decision does not carry a presumption of correctness sim-
ply because it emanates from the supplier. See Kobak, supra note 87, at 798-99 (statutory
and judicially created remedies for franchisees and dealers "tend] ...to focus on
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to a specific contract provision permitting the supplier to take the action
in question, 35 a showing that the dealer violated the contract, 36 or a
whether the franchisee is performing its obligations under the agreement, not on the over-
all long-term interests of the franchisor"). On the other hand, in interpreting statutory
and common law doctrines, some courts do take into consideration economic efficiency
factors. See, e.g., Chuck's Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289, 1293-
95 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (interpreting state unfair trade practices act as requiring a showing
that interbrand competition is adversely affected), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987);
Glaesner v. Beck/Arnley Corp., 790 F.2d 384, 387-88 (4th Cir. 1986) (state common law
tort of wrongful termination applies only where supplier acts arbitrarily or in bad faith;
supplier cannot be forced to keep unprofitable dealer because doing so harms other deal-
ers and consumers); Monmouth Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 509 A.2d
161, 170 (N.J. 1986) (to show a violation of state motor vehicle franchise act due to
establishment of a new automobile dealership, dealer must prove new dealership will
cause substantial deterioration in service to customers or that manufacturer is motivated
by primarily noneconomic factors). Interestingly, contrary to standard economic effi-
ciency doctrine, one court used the need for robust intrabrand competition as a factor in
interpreting a state unfair trade practices act. See McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 473 A.2d 1185, 1191 & n.14 (Conn. 1984).
135. See, e.g., Glaesner, 790 F.2d at 389-90 (holding that a dealer cannot recover for
tort of wrongful termination where dealership contract allowed for termination by either
party at any time without cause, there was no showing of bad faith, and there was evi-
dence of the dealer's failure to perform); Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
771 F.2d 672, 679 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding no breach of implied duty of good faith where
express contract provision allowed for termination by either party with notice); Domed
Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding no
breach of implied covenant of good faith where franchise contract allowed franchisor to
add hotels in area). Because of the protection offered by specific contract terms, franchise
contracts are getting more specific and longer, sometimes running 75 pages. See Claudia
H. Deutsch, Franchisees Fight Back, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1988, § 3, at 1.
136. See, e.g., Deutchland Enters., Ltd. v. Burger King Corp., 957 F.2d 449, 453 (7th
Cir. 1992) (manufacturer entitled to summary judgment where franchisee violated essen-
tial and reasonable contract provision); Brattleboro Auto Sales, Inc. v. Subaru of New
England, Inc., 633 F.2d 649, 652 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding no violation of state automobile
dealer act, where manufacturer terminated dealer who added three new car lines and
could not thereafter properly sell or service manufacturer's brand); Reinders Bros., Inc.
v. Rain Bird E. Sales Corp., 627 F.2d 44, 50-51 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that a trial is
necessary to determine whether termination was based on dealer's failure to use "best
efforts" to sell manufacturer's product or whether this was simply a pretextual reason
given by manufacturer); An-Port, Inc. v. MBR Indus., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1301, 1314
(D.P.R. 1991) (manufacturer entitled to summary judgment where dealer violated oral
contract by selling goods in direct competition with those of the manufacturer and misla-
beling some goods); Great Licks, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins, U.S.A. Co., [1987-89 Transfer
Binder] Bus. Fran. Guide (CCH) % 9252 (D. Minn. 1988) (good cause for termination
existed where franchisee palmed off other products as those of franchisor, had overdue
accounts, and refused to remodel store); Martin v. U-Haul Co., 251 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24-26
(Ct. App. 1988) (allowing dealer recovery for supplier's failure to give required notice of
termination but denying damages for tort of good faith and fair dealing where dealer
acted dishonestly and there was no showing of unequal bargaining positions); Dayan v.
McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 975 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (franchisor did not violate
implied duty of good faith when it terminated dealer for failure to maintain quality stan-
dards). A supplier typically has no difficulty terminating a dealer where the latter has
failed to pay royalty fees, advertising costs or otherwise breached the contractual rela-
tionship. See PPM Chem. Corp. v. Saskatoon Chem. Ltd., 931 F.2d 138, 139 (1st Cir.
1991); Hacienda Mexican Restaurant of Kalamazoo Corp. v. Hacienda Franchise Group,
Inc., 569 N.E.2d 661, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc. v.
Middletown Donut Corp., 100 N.J. 166, 178 (1985).
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demonstration of the fairness and reasonableness of the supplier's action
toward the dealer.137 Whatever legal theory is invoked, the common de-
nominator in these cases is an interest in supplanting the "law of the
jungle" 131 with a detailed case-by-case, industry-by-industry inquiry into
the fairness of the transaction and the good faith and bargaining power of
the parties.1 39 In doing so, moreover, courts engage in the balancing of
competing supplier and dealer concerns that antitrust courts shun. Fur-
thermore, while some of these cases are dealt with summarily," courts
in these areas have constructed few standing hurdles for dealers' and
express less concern with the number of potential lawsuits and potential
damages awards 4 2 than courts handling vertical antitrust cases."' 3
137. See, eg., East Bay Running Store, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 890 F.2d 996, 1000 (7th Cir.
1989) (finding no violation of state franchise act where supplier showed that its new pol-
icy regarding telephone and mail orders was a system-wide, nondiscriminatory change
applicable to all dealers, was supported by a business reason, did not affect the dealer's
marketing of other Nike products, and did not appropriate dealer's goodwill); Moodie v.
School Books Fairs, Inc., 889 F.2d 739, 745-46 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that supplier
acted reasonably in requiring that all dealers install computer systems leased by supplier);
J.I. Case Co. v. Early's, Inc. 721 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (supplier entitled
to summary judgment on state franchise act claim where dealer failed to install required
computer and supplier showed that requirement was applicable to all dealers and was
supported by a good business reason).
138. See In re Burger Chef Franchise Litig., [1987-89 Transfer Binder] Bus. Fran.
Guide (CCH) t 9072, at 18,696 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (Although court declines to find fiduci-
ary relationship in franchise situation, "neither is the court willing to characterize it as
one appropriately governed by the law of the jungle, which is how the [franchisors] ap-
pear to see it." Court opts for standard of good faith and reasonableness.).
139. See Weight Watchers of Quebec Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F. Supp.
1047, 1052-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[I]nterpretation of bargained for contract terms in a
franchise agreement must take account of the extent to which the franchisor has...
sought to exercise contractual control over the operation of the franchises."); A.S.
Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 144 N.E.2d 371, 376 (N.Y. 1957) ("In the present case we
are not dealing with competition between economic equals, but rather with the destruc-
tion of a relationship between the manufacturer and the distributor, which is recognized
to be that of dependency of the latter upon the former.... ."); Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Razumic, 390 A.2d 736, 742 (Pa. 1978) (dealer builds goodwill for both his own business
and supplier's business and, in exchange, dealer "can justifiably expect that his time,
effort, and other investments" promoting the goodwill of the supplier will not be de-
stroyed by an arbitrary termination).
140. Courts are often able to handle cases summarily when the dealership contract has
a specific provision on point. See, eg., An-Port, Inc. v. MBR Indus., Inc., 772 F. Supp.
1301, 1314 (D.P.R. 1991) (granting summary judgment for supplier where dealer violated
oral contract forbidding sales of directly competing goods); United States Surgical Corp.
v. Oregon Medical & Surgical Specialties, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(granting summary judgment for franchisor where contract expressly permitted nonre-
newal without cause).
141. Some standing hurdles do exist in the remedies outside of antitrust. To use a state
franchise statute, for instance, a dealer must show she is a "franchisee" with in the mean-
ing of the act. See supra note 89.
142. In the areas outside of antitrust, courts have shown a good deal more flexibility on
the question of damages and have often tailored the remedy or damage award to fit the
facts of the specific case. See, eg., Sir Speedy, Inc. v. L & P Graphics, Inc., 957 F.2d
1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
punitive damages under state unfair trade practices act); Draft-Line Corp. v. Hon Co.,
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Jurisprudentially, then, the balance of fairness versus economic con-
cerns that previously took place within antitrust analysis is now taking
place across the bounds of different legal theories. Put another way, these
new dealer remedies are filling the very gap left in antitrust by the eco-
nomic efficiency approach.'"
III. THE FAILURE TO COMPORT WITH REALITY
At the same time state statutory and common law has been expanding
to incorporate the fairness concerns eliminated from antitrust, a second
major development has occurred. Consumers are increasingly indicating
that they do not regard vertical restraints, and particularly vertical pric-
ing restraints, as beneficial to them. In the past, criticism of the eco-
nomic efficiency approach has come from antitrust scholars. 145 What is
781 F. Supp. 841, 846-48 (D.P.R. 1991) (refusing to grant damages to dealer despite
manufacturer's possible violation of franchise act where dealer's sales increased), aff'd,
983 F.2d 1046 (1st Cir. 1993); Machine Maintenance & Equip. Co. v. Cooper Indus.,
Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1112, 1117-18 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (reducing punitive damage award for
tortious interference with contract from $10 million to $100,000); In re Globe Distribs.,
Inc., 129 B.R. 304, 320-21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (doubling, but declining to treble, ac-
tual damages under state consumer protection act where supplier acted willfully and
knowingly); Kawasaki Shop of Aurora, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 544
N.E.2d 457, 464-66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that a trial court may refuse to treble
damages despite finding violation of state franchise act and breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing), appeal denied, 550 N.E.2d 556 (1990); Ridings v. Thoele,
Inc., 739 S.W.2d 547, 548-49 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (holding that a franchisee can recover
actual, but not punitive, damages for failure to give timely notice of termination); Nelson
v. National Fund Raising Consultants, Inc., 823 P.2d 1165, 1170-71 (Wash. Ct. App.)
(ruling in favor of franchisee on unfair royalty fee claim but refusing to enforce exclusive
territory provision in light of nonpayment of royalties), aff'd, en banc, 842 P.2d 473
(Wash. 1992).
143. Some commentators argue that the growth of private suits and automatic treble
damage awards in antitrust have been detrimental to antitrust jurisprudence. See 2 Phil-
lip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles
and Their Application 1 331b2 (1978); Posner, supra note 10, at 228; Arthur D. Austin,
Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust Strategy,
1978 Duke L.J. 1353; Edward D. Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individ-
ual Treble Damage Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40
Vand. L. Rev. 1277, 1328-36 (1987). But c.f, Charles A. Sullivan, Breaking Up the
Treble Play: Attacks on the Private Treble Damage Antitrust Action, 14 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 17 (1983) (treble damages offer unique advantages for private party antitrust
enforcement).
144. See Flynn, supra note 77, at 895 (the state franchise regulations can be seen as a
response to the lack of sensible federal regulation in antitrust or elsewhere).
145. See, e.g., Comanor, supra note 53, at 990-92 (arguing that the added services
achieved through vertical restraints may not appeal to the majority of consumers);
Crespi, supra note 12, at 239-42 (noting that the assumption that people make rational
economic choices cannot be verified); Flynn, supra note 1, at 1124-36 (arguing that the
economic efficiency advocates rely on economic models and assumptions instead of ana-
lyzing facts of actual case); Hawker, supra note 76, at 118-19 (arguing that the real goal
of Sherman Act is free interaction of consumers and retailers, not necessarily low prices
for consumers); Kaplow, supra note 12, at 520-25 (arguing that the Chicago School's
analysis of tie-ins is flawed because it fails to recognize welfare costs of exploitation of
existing monopoly power); Pitofsky, supra note 76, at 323 ("[T]hey assume a kind of
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new is the emerging and widespread disbelief now being voiced by con-
sumers themselves.
The pervasiveness of the public's disbelief is perhaps best seen in the
response of large, well-respected consumer groups to proposed federal
legislation to reverse partially the Supreme Court's Monsanto decision
and to reverse fully its Sharp decision." The most recent bill, known as
the "Price Fixing Prevention Act," was introduced into Congress in
199 1. " The act would codify the per se rule against minimum vertical
price fixing. 48 In addition, in a partial reversal of Monsanto, the act
would allow a jury to infer a conspiracy from evidence that a manufac-
turer terminated a dealer in response to demands or complaints from
other dealers.149 Furthermore, the act would make illegal the setting,
changing, or maintaining of a minimum resale price, even if no specific
perfect competition encountered only in theory, never in practice."); Shores, supra note
12, at 404-06 (stating that vertical restraints can be inefficient where there is brand differ-
entiation); Slawson, supra note 12, at 263-73 (assumptions underlying Chicago School's
analysis of tie-ins are faulty in assuming that tie-in is anticompetitive only if seller has
power in tying market); Weiss, supra note 12, at 525-31 (arguing that vertical restraints
do not necessarily generate an optimal level of services from the consumer's point of
view). See also authorities cited supra at notes 7 and 12.
146. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
147. H.R. 1470 and S. 429, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The bill was passed by the
House of Representatives in October 1991 but with an amendment (the Campbell amend-
ment) providing a defense "that the defendant was so small in the relevant market as to
lack market power." H.R. Rep. No. 145, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7757 (1991). Consumer
groups criticized the Campbell amendment as "gutting" the bill. Bill Easing Price-Fixing
Suits OK'd; Consumer Groups Attack Amendment, Atlanta Const., Oct 11, 1991, at D3
(quoting Kristen Rand of Consumers Union); Discounters Bill Passe" Amendment Pulls
Teeth, Wash. Times, Oct. 11, 1991, at Cl. The bills introduced in the 102d Congress are
summarized in Correia, supra note 53, at 242-44.
The 1991 bill was previously introduced in the 101st Congress as H.R. 1236 and S. 865.
Similar bills were introduced in the 100th Congress (H.LR 585 and S. 430) and in the 99th
Congress (H.R. 5293). The 1987 bill is discussed in Day, supra note 37, at 369-73.
148. See H.R. 1470, supra note 147; S. 429, supra note 147. The bill specifically leaves
in place the rule-of-reason standard for nonprice vertical restraints, thereby codifying
Sylvania. See iL Additionally, the bill only applies to minimum, not maximum, vertical
price fixing. See id Most commentators agree that maximum vertical price fixing is pro-
consumer because it allows the supplier to keep retail prices down. See Blair & Lang,
supra note 1; White, supra note 1, at 48-53. But see Hawker, supra note 76, at 116-17
(maximum vertical price fixing should be barred because it interferes with free interaction
of consumers and retailers).
149. See H.R. 1470, supra note 147; S. 429, supra note 147. The Monsanto decision
held that, while complaints from dealers were some evidence of a conspiracy, evidence of
such complaints and the manufacturer's actions responding to those complaints was not,
by itself, sufficient to get to the jury on the conspiracy issue. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at
764. Specifically the bill permits a jury to infer a conspiracy in a vertical case from evi-
dence: (i) that a dealer made a request, demand or threat to a supplier that the supplier
take steps to curtail or eliminate price competition, and (ii) because of such request, de-
mand or threat, the supplier terminated or refused to continue to supply goods to a com-
petitor of the dealer, and (iii) the request, demand or threat is the major cause of
termination or refusal to continue to supply. See H.R. 1470, supra note 147; S. 429, supra
note 147.
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price or price level is agreed upon, thus overruling Sharp.150
Well-established and sophisticated consumer groups such as Consum-
ers Union, 5' the American Association of Retired Persons, 52 Consumer
Federation of America, 53 the National Council of Senior Citizens, 54
and Public Citizen's Congress Watch"' have all publicly voiced support
for the bill.' 56 In doing so, these consumer groups take issue with the
fundamental precepts of the economic efficiency approach. Rather than
regarding vertical restraints as benefitting the consumer, they character-
ize such restraints, particularly vertical pricing restraints, as "anticon-
sumer" 15 7 and simply a way for a supplier and a high-priced retailer "to
150. See id.
151. Consumers Union is a non-profit membership organization that provides informa-
tion, education and counsel to consumers and publishes Consumer Reports magazine,
which has a circulation of 3.5 million. See Retail Competition Enforcement Act. Hearing
Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 n.1 (1987).
152. The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) is a 32 million member
organization. Members consist of persons 50 years or older, working or retired. See
Encyclopedia of Associations 1349-50 (28th ed. 1993).
153. Consumer Federation of America consists of 240 member groups, including na-
tional, regional, state and local consumer groups, consumer cooperatives, public utilities,
and labor organizations. See id. at 1755.
154. The National Council of Senior Citizens has five million members with over 5,000
local clubs, councils and state affiliates. See id. at 1211; Consumer Protection Against
Price Fixing: Hearings on S. 429 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies and Busi-
ness Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 62, 65 (1991).
155. Public Citizen's Congress Watch is a subdivision of Public Citizen, a nationwide
public interest organization with 2 million members, formed by Ralph Nader in 1971.
Congress Watch is a congressional lobby representing consumer interests. See To Amend
the Sherman Act Regarding Retail Competition: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (1989); Encyclopedia of Associations 1731, 1734-35
(28th ed. 1993).
156. In total, over 40 national and state consumer organizations support the bill. See
To Amend the Sherman Act Regarding Retail Competition: Hearing Before the Sen.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1989). In addition the National
Association of Attorneys General has put its support behind the bill. See 137 Cong. Rec.
S5340-41 (daily ed. May 6, 1991) (letter from National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral, Apr. 30, 1991); see also infra notes 172 and 173. Not surprisingly, over 270 would-
be discounters and retailer organizations also support the bill. See To Amend the Sher-
man Act Regarding Retail Competition: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 37-40 (1989). Organizations opposing the most recent bills in-
cluded the Business Roundtable and the National Association of Manufacturers. See 137
Cong. Rec. S5338 (daily ed. May 6, 1991) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); Consumer
Protection Against Price Fixing: Hearings on S. 429 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 142-58 (1991); 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1536, at 437 (Oct. 10,
1991).
157. See, e.g., 137 Cong. Rec. S5341 (letter from AARP, May 3, 1991) (criticizing the
"anticompetitive" behavior involved in vertical price-fixing and the Supreme Court's
"anti-consumer" decisions in Monsanto and Sharp); Consumers Union, Why Consumers
Need H.R. 1470, The Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991, 1 (unpublished press release)
[hereinafter Consumers Union] (criticizing the Chicago School as an "anti-consumer the-
ory of economics"); Retail Competition Enforcement Act: Hearing Before Senate Comm.
on Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1987) (statement of Mark Silbergeld, Director of
Consumers Union) ("It stands to reason that when manufacturer and retailer are agree-
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drive price competition from the marketplace."' 8 Intrabrand competi-
tion, according to these consumer groups, is not economically irrelevant,
but rather is essential to free-market competition and low prices for the
public.159 The consumer advocacy groups cite studies showing that ver-
tical pricing restraints cost consumers over $1 billion each year"W and
ing not to sell the consumer a product below a certain price, they are not conspiring in
the cnsumer's best interest. The assertions to the contrary by certain devotees of the...
Chicago School of Economics are clearly counter-intuitive and ...not supported by
empirical evidence.").
158. See, e.g., 137 Cong. Rec. S5341 (daily ed. May 6, 1991) (letter from AARP, May
3, 1991) ("Vertical price-fixing occurs when a high-priced retailer conspires with a sup-
plier to discontinue the supply of goods to a discounter in an effort to drive price competi-
tion from the marketplace. ... The result for consumers is higher prices and less
choice."); id. (letter from National Council of Senior Citizens, May 3, 1991) ("Over the
past few years, we have seen a growing number of discount stores closing their doors or
offering fewer goods because of price-fixing agreements between manufacturing and
higher priced, competing retail outlets.... The next thing you know, all of us are paying
higher prices because the check of competitive forces is gone."); Eleanor Chute, Discount
Stores Fighting Pricing Pressures, Pittsburgh Press, Mar. 17, 1991, at B6 (As a result of
Supreme Court decisions, "'[m]anufacturers and ... high-priced retailers literally feel
free to coerce and threaten discounters and drive them out of the marketplace. The ulti-
mate victim is consumers who are forced to pay a price-fixing premium on a variety of
goods.'" (quoting Kristen Rand, counsel for Consumers Union)). Daniel J. Schuler,
Legislative Director of the National Council of Senior Citizens, echoed the same view in
his testimony before Congress:
[A] serious cancer is growing in the marketplace that will affect the pocketbook
of every consumer. Full-price retailers, rather than compete with discounters,
are now using their economic muscle to pressure many manufacturers to force
discounters to raise prices or just out-and-out terminate their business with
them. Unfortunately, the U.S. Justice Department, Federal Trade Commission
and two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases have encouraged manufacturers and
full-price retailers to increase price-fixing activities and force the consumer to
pay higher prices.
Consumer Protection Against Price Fixing: Hearings on S. 429 Before the Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1991) (statement of Daniel J. Schuler).
159. Without intrabrand competition from discounting dealers, "the result is higher
prices and fewer choices." Consumers Union, supra note 157, at 5. Other consumer
advocates have voiced similar concerns. "American consumers may one day face a situa-
tion where the only price on a product is the one set by the manufacturer. This is a
development that threatens senior citizens' pocketbooks that are already stretched too
thin." 137 Cong. Rec. S5341 (daily ed. May 6, 1991) (letter from National Council of
Senior Citizens, May 3, 1991). Vertical price fixing results in "higher prices and less
choice" for consumers; the proposed bill "will help to insure vigorous price competition
in the marketplace." Ia (letter from AARP, May 3, 1991); "[D]uring [a] recessionary
period, [discounters] are not just an option but are a salvation, offering a way to buy
goods that many consumers could afford at [the] suggested retail price." Vertical Price
Fixing: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Activities Af-
fecting Small Business of House Comm. on Small Business, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1983)
(statement of Barbara F. Warden, Executive Director, National Consumers' League).
Kristen Rand, counsel for Consumers Union, concludes the bill is one of the "most im-
portant economic issues of consumers that being considered by Congress." Chute, supra
note 158.
160. Consumers Union cites a 1969 Economic Report of the President showing that
resale price maintenance costs consumers $1.2 billion per year. Consumers Union, supra
note 157, at 4. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Jack Brooks has been quoted as
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raise prices by as much as fifty percent. 16' To these consumer organiza-
tions, the true ally of the consumer is not the manufacturer, as the eco-
nomic efficiency advocates argue, but the discounting dealer.'62
Various popular press newspapers and magazines echo the same views.
These papers and magazines, which are far more likely to reflect the
views of the common consumer than is the Journal of Law and Econom-
ics, characterize vertical restraints as a way in which manufacturers and
retailers, "hungry for fatter profits," "rig" the marketplace., 63 Shoppers
saying that resale price maintenance costs consumers $20 billion a year. See Paul M.
Barrett, Anti-Discount Policies of Manufacturers Are Penalizing Certain Cut-Price Stores,
Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1991, at BI. AARP says the proposed bill "will save consumers
billions of dollars each year by increasing the variety and amount of goods available at
discount prices." 137 Cong. Rec. S5341 (daily ed. May 6, 1991) (letter from AARP, May
3, 1991).
161. Consumers Union cites a 1975 Department of Justice study showing prices were
18 to 27% higher where resale price maintenance was permitted. Consumers Union,
supra note 157, at 4. Public Citizen's Congress Watch conducted a study that showed a
difference of 10 to 45%. Michael Waldman & Jonathan W. Cuneo, Business Forum:
Doom For Discounters?, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1988, at 3-2. Another survey, conducted
by eleven consumer groups, showed consumers could save as much as 50% by buying
through discounters. Kerry E. Knobelsdorff, Discounters Say Supplies Have Been Cut
Since Supreme Court Ruling, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 8, 1988, at 11, 16. Before 1975,
when states were allowed to permit resale price maintenance under the so-called fair
trade laws, resale price maintenance was said to "increase[ prices by as much as 37
percent." 121 Cong. Rec. 38,050 (Dec. 2, 1975) (statement of Sen. Brooke).
162. A spokesperson for Consumers Union, for instance, has written: "Consumers
who benefit from the $125 billion discount industry... should take note [of resale price
maintenance] .... Legislation is pending in Congress that would restore some protection
afforded to discounters and help turn back the judicial attack on price competition. ....
[I]f President Bush is at all concerned with the welfare of low and middle income con-
sumers, he should sign the legislation." M. Kristen Rand, Fixing Prices With a Nod and
a Wink, Christian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 24, 1990, at 19.
163. See Michael Arndt, Consumers Pay More as Price-fixing Spreads, Chi. Trib., Aug.
18, 1991, at C1; see also A Ruling That Doesn't Do Discounters Justice, Bus. Wk., May 16,
1988, at 146 ("The probable result [of Sharp] is that prices will be higher .... If the
[proposed] legislation survives a threatened Presidential veto, consumers will have the
freedom of choice and price competition that antitrust laws are supposed to ensure.");
Consumer Protection, J. Commerce, Apr. 12, 1991, at 4A ("When a supplier and one of
its high-price retailers conspire to shut out another retailer that sells the supplier's prod-
uct for less, consumers lose out."); Curbing Price Fixers, Boston Globe, Mar. 21, 1991, at
54 (supporting the proposed legislation; "Price competition, after all, is the most promi-
nent feature of modern retailing and every sensible action to preserve it should be
taken."); Keeping the Marketplace Free, Patriot-News (Harrisburg, PA), Mar. 7, 1991, at
A 12 (Vertical price-fixing and the Sharp decision "could result in a decrease in consumer
choice and competitiveness as discounters are driven from the marketplace .... The
country needs a Justice Department that seeks to maintain the competitive marketplace
we have, not one which chooses to ignore price fixing to the detriment of consumers and
other retailers."); Prohibit Retail Price-Fixing, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Mar. 23, 1990, at
2C ("There seems to be no end to the task of repairing the damage done in the 1980's to
the rights of American consumers .... Both Missouri senators ... should side with
consumers against price fixing [and support proposed legislation]."); Retail Class Wars,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 5, 1991, at 1OA ("[Vertical] price-fixing hurts consumers and
corrupts the free-enterprise system.... Despite high-toned arguments from pricey stores
and manufacturers, the fundamental problem is that some businesses don't really like
competition.").
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lose out through "inflat[ed] prices of everything from candy to com-
puters""' and "reduce[d] ... selection at off-price stores."'' 65 Vertical
pricing restraints, far from benefitting the consumers through increased
services, "are imposed to benefit manufacturers and full-priced retail-
ers,' 1 66 particularly, the "tonier stores that have higher mark-ups. '"'67
The economic efficiency argument in favor of vertical restraints is not a
value neutral theory, but rather is part of a politically pro-business
bias. 161 In short, it is a theory that is "incredible," "nonsense,"
"strange," "esoteric," and "tortured."' 69  As one publication stated:
"[A]nyone who believes that [vertical pricing restraints result in added
dealer services] hasn't been shopping lately."' 70
Similarly, state attorneys general-who are typically elected state offi-
cials, accountable to consumer voters''-are virtually unanimous in
164. Arndt, supra note 163.
165. Id
166. Michael Arndt, Co-op Ad Deals Avoid Price-fixing Strictures, Chi. Trib., Sept. 1,
1991, at Cl. The cause in the "upsurge" in vertical price-fixing is attributed to "inroads
by Japanese and other foreign businesses accustomed to dictating prices at home; desper-
ation among full-priced stores that are steadily losing sales to off-price outlets, yet need
higher markups to afford space in fancier shopping malls; marketers' success in turning
brand names into status symbols; and just plain greed." Arndt, supra note 163.
167. See Retail Class Wars, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 5, 1991, at 10A.
168. See The Price Is Right, Arizona Daily Star, Mar. 13, 1991, at 10A ("Congress is
still trying [through the proposed legislation] to undo the damage done to the rights of
the little guy during the big-business Reagan years.")
169. See A Ruling That Doesn't Do Discounters Justice, Bus. Wk., May 16, 1988, at
146 ("Sometimes the U.S. Supreme Court has a blind faith in esoteric legal theories ....
[In Sharp] the high court acted on one of those notions, and consumers may be big
losers."); Prohibit Retail Price-Fixing, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Mar. 23, 1990, at 2C
(Sharp is based on "tortured reasoning"); Some Comfort in Setback, L.A. Times, May 4,
1988, at 2-6 ("The majority in [Sharp] arrived at its strange conclusions by adopting the
economic analysis promoted by the University of Chicago's antitrust experts and the legal
views of the Reagan administration .... For discounters now worried about their sur-
vival and consumers fearful that the court's decision will boost prices, there is one com-
fort: Whatever the court has done can be undone by Congress."); The Price Is Right,
Arizona Daily Star, Mar. 13, 1991, at 10A ("Incredibly some have even tried to portray
the court's ruling [in Sharp] as beneficial to consumers. Higher prices, the argument
goes, will guarantee better service. Nonsense. All that consumers face for sure are
steeper prices and less choice in shopping.").
170. A Ruling That Doesn't Do Discounters Justice, Bus. Wk., May 16, 1988, at 146.
This is not to say that all popular press newspapers support the proposed legislation. A
New York Times editorial characterized the proposed legislation as "overkill" and echoed
the economic efficiency view that: "If manufacturers were trying to jack up prices, they
wouldn't ordinarily use vertical price restraints. All they would need to do is charge all
their dealers more. The purpose of vertical price restraints is to encourage better service
to consumers." Price Fixing Isn't Always Gouging, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1991, at A16.
171. The vast majority of state attorneys general are elected, and as one stated: "We
hear from consumers every day by the droves." Paul Van Dam, De'elopments in Con-
sumer Protection: The States' View, 60 Antitrust L.J. 133, 134-35 (1991). The actions of
the state attorneys general have been praised by consumer groups but criticized by eco-
nomic efficiency advocates. See Landes & Posner, supra note 78, at 613. Whether the
state attorneys general are praised or criticized, however, the point is the same: the law-
suits brought by and stances taken by these state officials typically reflect the opinion of
1993]
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condemning vertical price restraints 17 2 and in supporting the proposed
federal legislation.173 They have brought resale price maintenance cases
against a number of manufacturers,174 and, in doing so, have won the
the average consumer. Those consumer views may, as the economic efficiency advocates
contend, be uninformed and wrong, but they are nonetheless the views of the populace.
172. In 1985, the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) announced a
drive to combat vertical restraints on discounters. All 50 members of NAAG voted
unanimously to adopt stricter vertical price-fixing guidelines and to take stronger action
with regard to both price and nonprice restraints on dealers. See NAAG Adopts Alterna-
tive Guidelines to Govern Vertical Restraints of Trade, 49 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1243, at 978 (Dec. 5, 1985); Nathaniel C. Nash, States'Drive on Price Fixing,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1985, at 35. Vertical price fixing, they contend, is doubly harmful: it
"infringe[s] upon the retailers' rights to compete freely and ... raise[s] the retail prices of
consumer goods." Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1989: Hearings On H.R. 1236 Before
the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1989) (statement of J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of
Maryland). Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, testified:
[T]he debate over effective standards for combating vertical price fixing comes
down to two simple issues. First, should consumers pay more for goods and
services than the stores where they shop wish to charge them? Second, in a free
market economy, should retailers be free to charge prices which they believe
will best serve their own business interests, without coercion from large manu-
facturers and large competing retailers who wish to end price competition?
Id. at 15.
173. NAAG and 46 individual attorneys general voiced support for the proposed legis-
lation. In a letter to Congress, they stated: "Action by Congress is ... necessary to
restore aggressive price competition to the marketplace." 137 Cong. Rec. S5340-41
(daily ed. May 6, 1991) (letter of NAAG, Apr. 30, 1991); Elisa Williams, Discounters Bill
Passes, Wash. Times, Oct. 11, 1991, at Cl.
174. Lawsuits have been brought against Mitsubishi, Nintendo, Panasonic and Mi-
nolta, among others. Attorneys general for all 50 states and the District of Columbia
sued Mitsubishi and obtained a settlement of almost $8 million. See Maryland v. Mit-
subishi Elects. Am., Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,743 (D. Md. 1992); Ohio ex rel.
Fisher v. Mitsubishi Elects. Am., Inc., 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,744 (D. Md. 1992).
A similar suit against Nintendo resulted in a settlement requiring Nintendo pay up to
$25 million for consumer rebates, $3 million to the states for antitrust enforcement and
$1.75 million to cover the legal costs of the lead states. 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1538, at 513-14 (Oct. 24, 1991). The role of the states in the lawsuit was
crucial. According to one reporter: "Nintendo. - . showed only scorn when the FTC
first suggested a negotiated deal .... The electronics firm agreed to pay back consumers
only after the state prosecutors, who were conducting a parallel investigation, agreed to
join in a settlement." Michael Arndt, States Move to Curb Price-Fixing as U.S. Takes
Hands-Off Approach, Chi. Trib., Aug. 19, 1991, at C1. Forty-nine state attorneys general
obtained a $16 million settlement with Panasonic in a 1989 resale price-fixing case. In re
Panasonic Consumer Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 89 Civ. 0368 (S.D.N.Y. June 5,
1989).
In 1986, 37 states reached a settlement with Minolta. See In re Minolta Camera Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 668 F. Supp. 456 (D. Md. 1987). In addition, Pennsylvania obtained a
$75,000 settlement from New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc. in a 1989 suit, Settlement of
Pennsylvania's RPM Charge Against Shoe Maker is Approved By Court, 57 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1428, at 191 (Aug. 10, 1989); New York sued milk distribu-
tors in 1981 for vertical price fixing, see State v. Dairylea Coop Inc., 547 F. Supp. 306
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 698 F.2d 567 (2nd Cir. 1983); and California recently
settled a suit against Steelcase Inc., a large furniture manufacturer, see People v. Steelcase
Inc., 792 F. Supp. 84 (C.D. Cal. 1992); 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1602,
at 174-75 (Feb. 18, 1993). The state attorneys general contend that they are " 'only get-
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praise of consumer groups'7 5 and the criticism of economic efficiency ad-
vocates who accuse them of trying to appease consumer voters. 17 6
Most recently, in something of an about-face, the Supreme Court ad-
ded its voice to those expressing doubts about whether the economic effi-
ciency theory actually jibes with reality. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.,"' independent service providers charged Kodak
with illegally tying service and replacement parts.17 8 In support of its
ting the tip of the iceberg' .... 'There are many other cases that we decline to prosecute
or even investigate because of the current state of the law.'" Arndt, supra (quoting
George Sampson, chief of the antitrust division in the New York attorney general's of-
fice).
These lawsuits are typically brought by the state attorney general as parens patriae for
the consumers in the state. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1988). For a discussion of parens patriae
lawsuits, see Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Parens Patriae Actions: An Assessment, 49 An-
titrust L.J. 1015 (1981) (reviewing history and effect ofparenspatriae legislation); Milton
Handler & Michael Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of
Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 Yale L.J. 626 (1976) (arguing that the
parens patriae lawsuits will have little effect because consumers are rarely direct
purchasers).
175. See Arndt, supra note 174 ("Shoppers should be thankful [to the state attorneys
general], says Kristen Rand, a Consumers Union attorney. 'The situation would be a lot
worse if the state AGs were not out there,' she says. 'Without them, the conduct would
be more blatant and more pervasive.' "); Constance L. Hays, Panasonic to Return S16
Million to Consumers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1989, at Al, A27. (" '[T]he antitrust law is
alive and well at the state level, even though it has been scorned by Federal prosecu-
tors.'" (quoting Michael Waldman, legislative director for Public Citizens' Congress
Watch)).
On an international level, the federal government, like the states, has voiced concern
about the anticompetitive aspects of vertical pricing restraints. It has urged the Japanese
government to ban a decades-old practice of permitting manufacturers to set retail prices
of certain products in the Japanese market. See 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 1546, at 732 (Dec. 19, 1992). Interestingly, a survey by the Japanese Fair Trade
Commission reached the same conclusion as the U.S. consumer groups: resale price
maintenance limits price competition among manufacturers and causes prices to rise.
Furthermore, the survey showed that the majority of Japanese consumers (like their U.S.
counterparts) favor abolition of resale price maintenance. See id. The Japanese Fair
Trade Commission recently issued orders to four electronic appliance manufacturers and
to a printing equipment manufacturer requiring they cease resale price maintenance. See
64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1602, at 183 (Feb. 18, 1993); 64 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1616, at 658 (May 27, 1993).
176. William Landes and Richard Posner have stated: "Given the political character
of parens patriae enforcement, it is doubtful that it can be relied upon as an adequate
antitrust deterrent. There may well be a tendency under parens patriae for state attor-
neys general to bring headline-grabbing, scapegoat-seeking suits against politically un-
popular corporations, with little regard for the intrinsic antitrust merit of the suit ...."
Landes & Posner, supra note 78, at 613. In such criticism is the implicit recognition that
state attorneys general bring resale price cases with their consumer constituencies in
mind.
Posner has not limited his criticism to state officials. With respect to Department of
Justice lawyers, he has said: "Trial lawyers tend to be combative rather than reflective,
and the [DOJ]'s trial lawyers, because they are relatively poorly paid, tend to be young or
mediocre, or to be zealots." Posner, supra note 10, at 231.
177. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
178. See iL at 2076-79. The plaintiffs, who competed with Kodak in the market for
servicing Kodak equipment, alleged that Kodak replacement parts were the tying prod-
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summary judgment motion, Kodak made the basic economic efficiency
arguments: the key to competition was the interbrand market; so long as
Kodak lacked market power in the interbrand original equipment mar-
ket, the vertical tying restraints it placed on the intrabrand markets for
Kodak replacement parts and services were irrelevant; and interbrand
competition would act as a check on any effort by Kodak to charge mo-
nopoly prices in the intrabrand parts and services markets because if Ko-
dak raised its parts and service prices above competitive levels, potential
customers would simply stop buying Kodak equipment. 179
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's economic efficiency argu-
ment 80 and held that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to
survive the summary judgment motion.181 The Court refused to accept
the economically based "legal presumptions" offered by Kodak and
noted that economic theory is not an "immutable physical law."1 ' The
majority repeatedly responded to Kodak's economic theory by references
to factual evidence in the record, such as the rise in both intrabrand ser-
vice prices and Kodak's interbrand equipment prices (suggesting that in-
terbrand competition was not acting as a check on intrabrand price rises
or vice versa).18 3 Similarly, the Court refused to assume, as the economic
efficiency theory does, that consumers are knowledgeable.I84 In sum, the
majority characterized Kodak's argument as "mere conjecture" and
questioned "why the Court should accept.., theory on faith rather than
requiring the usual evidence needed to win a summary judgment mo-
tion."185 In language reminiscent of its early vertical restraint cases,186
the Court concluded that legality must be decided case by case on the
uct and Kodak service was the tied product. In addition to the tying claim, the plaintiffs
also charged Kodak with monopolizing and attempting to monopolize the service mar-
ket, in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. See id.
179. See id. at 2081-82.
180. The Department of Justice took the same position. See id. at 2084 n. 16.
181. The District Court had granted summary judgment for Kodak on both the tying
claim and the monopolization and attempted monopolization claims. See 1989-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 68,402 (N.D. Cal. 1988). The Ninth Circuit reversed. See 903 F.2d 612
(1990). The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit with respect to both the tying
claim and the section 2 claims. See 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
182. 112 S. Ct. at 2084. As Professor Hay notes the Kodak decision cannot be re-
garded as a total rejection of economic analysis in antitrust; the Court merely declined to
rule, after limited discovery, that Kodak was incapable of having market power in the
service market. George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on
the Kodak Case, 62 Antitrust L.J. 177, 183-84 (1993).
183. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2084.
184. See id. at 2087. The Court noted that "it makes little sense to assume, in the
absence of any evidentiary support, that equipment-purchasing decisions are based on an
accurate assessment of total cost of equipment, service, and parts." Id.
185. Id. at 2089 n.29. The three dissenting justices, in contrast, wrote a basic Chicago
School economic efficiency dissertation on the impossibility of a nonmonopolist affecting
the interbrand market through an intrabrand restraint. Like the opinion in Sharp the
dissenting opinion was long on economic theory and short on citations to the record. The
dissent found "no [economic] sense" in considering further a tying claim when the de-
fendant lacked power in the interbrand market. Id. at 2095-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
contrast to the majority decision which looked to record evidence regarding specific cus-
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basis of "actual market realities."' 8 7 Specifically, a jury must consider
evidence that this market for this product might not function in accord-
ance with the economic efficiency theory."'
Thus, in a variety of contexts a second major flaw in the economic
efficiency approach to vertical restraints is emerging. In the eyes of many
consumers, the approach seems unrelated to the real world. Whether
speaking through consumer groups, the popular press, or their state at-
torneys general, the message is the same. The consuming public sees in-
trabrand competition and dealer autonomy as vital for consumer
protection.
IV. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS
The developments outlined in Parts II and III of this Article affect not
only the current law of vertical restraints but also raise significant ques-
tions about the future of the new dealer remedies and antitrust
jurisprudence.
With respect to current law, the effect of the new dealer remedies is
manifest: the simplification of antitrust vertical restraint law brought
about by economic theory is illusory. The difficult tasks of balancing
intrabrand and interbrand effects and accommodating fairness issues
may be gone from antitrust,'8 9 but they have resurfaced elsewhere.19 0
A. The Future of Dealer Remedies
Saying dealer remedies currently exist outside of antitrust, however,
does not mean they should continue to be tolerated. 19' A number of
economic efficiency advocates argue that, provided there is active compe-
tition among suppliers in the marketing of dealerships and franchises and
tomers, the dissent emphasized the theoretical "rational consumers." Id. at 2097 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
186. The majority purported to distinguish Sylvania on the grounds that (I) there was
active interbrand competition in Sylvania and (2) the plaintiff in Sylvania was a dealer
whereas the plaintiffs in Kodak were competitors. Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2084-85 & n.18.
187. Id, at 2082. There was evidence, the Court noted, that buyers did not always
consider the total cost of the package---equipment, service and parts-at the time of
purchase; that competitors in the interbrand market might not be providing a check on
Kodak's pricing; and that Kodak might not be acting in a way consistent with the best
interest of the consumers in the servicing market. See id at 2085-87. See Robert H.
Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial Role
in the Post-Kodak World, 62 Antitrust L.J. 193, 197-98 (1993) (Kodak opinion shows
how information imperfections can affect competition in market).
188. See Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085.
189. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
190. See supra part II.
191. The federal antitrust laws do not preempt the state franchise and dealer laws. See
California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (the federal antitrust laws do not
preempt state antitrust laws); Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme,
58 Ind. L.J. 375, 378-79, 384-402 (1983) (fact that state antitrust laws are more favorable
to plaintiffs does not mean they are preempted by federal law; Congress envisioned fed-
eral antitrust laws as supplement to state laws).
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there is truthful disclosure at the time of contracting, 92 the prospective
franchisee-dealer is adequately protected. 193 If she does not like the
terms being offered by one supplier, she can contract with another., 94
That during the dealer relationship the dealer is subordinate to the sup-
plier has nothing to do with the supplier's power in the interbrand mar-
ket' 9' but is simply the result of a freely negotiated contract that gave the
supplier certain rights.1 96 Indeed, a supplier's ability to impose vertical
restraints or terminate a dealer at will, the argument goes, is beneficial
192. Franchisees, they argue, receive a number of benefits from participating in a
franchise program as opposed to opening a stand-alone business. The franchisee gets use
of a valuable trademark, often receives managerial advice and financial support from the
franchisor while still having her own business, and frequently has a reduced risk of busi-
ness failure. See Lockerby, supra note 87, at 858; Rubin, supra note 94, at 230. As long
as there is a competitive market for franchises, the franchisee will be adequately protected
and further legal protection is unnecessary. See Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 311-15; Rubin,
supra note 94, at 232. These commentators do not, however, object to statutory require-
ments for disclosures in connection with the sale of franchises. See supra note 95.
193. See Brickley et al., supra note 90, at 111 (the argument that the individual does
not know what is best for him is fallacious where there is full disclosure prior to sale of
the franchise). The various common law remedies for dealers are criticized by Lockerby,
supra note 87, at 851-57 (uses of unconscionability, fiduciary duty and good faith are
objectionable on both doctrinal and practical grounds). See also Gary Myers, The Differ-
ing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law,
77 Minn. L. Rev. 1097, 1147 (1993) (tortious interference law is poor vehicle for gov-
erning supplier-dealer relationship).
194. Given the multitude of different franchises being offered, no single franchisor has
a monopoly on the interbrand franchise market. See Braun, supra note 87, at 224-25
(even assuming franchisor has market power, that is not what induces prospective fran-
chisee to enter into franchise contract; use of standardized contracts is irrelevant to valid-
ity and enforcement of contracts); Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 314-15. Pitegoff also argues
that the assumption of unequal bargaining power between the franchisor and franchisee is
faulty. See id. at 315.
195. The economic efficiency advocates argue that the time to look at the franchisor-
franchisee relationship is at the outset when the franchisee chooses a particular franchise
from the interbrand market for sale of franchises. See Klein & Saft, supra note 55, at 356.
196. See id. Some commentators contend that after the franchise is purchased, the
franchisee is similar in many respects to an employee or agent and ought not be viewed as
an independent firm. See Braun, supra note 87, at 158-73, 196 (franchise relationship is
sui generis but akin to agency or employment relationship in that individuality of fran-
chisee is submerged); Brickley & Dark, supra note 89, at 402-04 (franchising is a form of
incentive-based compensation falling between salaried employee and independent firm);
Rubin, supra note 94, at 225 (franchisee is essentially an employee and to treat her as a
separate firm is economically improper).
Freedom of contract was the basis for Justice Holmes' dissent in Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411 (1911) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and the
majority opinion in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 305 (1919). One of the
strongest arguments in favor of freedom of contract in the franchise situation is found in
Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & Econ. 293, 314-
15 (1975). On the other hand, some critics of the Chicago approach argue that its heavy
reliance on freedom of contract is nothing more than a calculated political maneuver to
protect established, big business interests. See Hovenkamp, supra note 7, 232-33; Ru-
dolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 263, 308-10. Rep.
John J. LaFalce, Chairman of the House Small Business Committee and proponent of
federal franchise legislation, dismisses the freedom of contract argument. "[T]here is a
tremendous imbalance in the legal relationship between franchisors and franchisees.
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
not just to the supplier but also to other dealers, prospective dealers, and
consumers. 19' A "good" dealer need not fear such restraints because the
rational supplier will not make his dealers unprofitable or terminate a
money-making outlet.198 The economic efficiency proponents conclude
that the new dealer remedies should be curtailed to the extent they im-
pose vague standards of fairness or business ethics on suppliers. Such
standards merely increase the costs of doing business, costs that will in-
evitably be passed on to consumers. 99
They toss a 75-page contract at you and say: 'If you want to deal with us, you sign here.
We don't negotiate any provisions.'" Victor, supra note 92, at 2185.
197. The promise of a uniform product or service is what attracts many consumers to a
franchise establishment, and therefore the franchisor has a strong interest in quality con-
trol to maintain the value of his brand or trade name. Brickley & Dark, supra note 89, at
402; Rubin, supra note 94, at 227-28. Moreover, because the value of a franchise depends
largely on the consumer's perception that a standardized product or service is being of-
fered, any one franchisee has a financial incentive to "ride" on the reputation being up-
held by her fellow franchisees and to cut her own costs (and hence increase her profits) by
offering a lower quality product or service to the consumer. Goldberg, supra note 53, at
746; Klein & Saft, supra note 55, at 349-50. The franchisee's incentive to free ride and
sell a below-standard product or service is strongest where the level of repeat customers is
low. Brickley et al., supra note 90, at 104; see also Brickley & Dark, supra note 89, at 406(discussing franchisee free-rider problem but noting that franchisor may also free ride in
defaulting on obligations to provide training and managerial assistance).
Such free riding hurts the franchisor by diminishing the value of his franchise; it hurts
"good" franchisees by lowering future demand for the product; it harms the consumer
who receives a lower quality good although paying full price; and if the franchisor cannot
terminate the free-riding franchisee easily and speedily, prospective franchisees lose. See
Epstein, supra note 196, at 314-15; Klein & Saft, supra note 55, at 349-51; Lockerby,
supra note 87, at 866-68; Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 309-10; Rubin, supra note 94, at 227-
28. In fact undue restrictions on the franchisor could lead to a lessening in the amount of
franchises available as suppliers begin doing their own distribution. See Brickley et al.,
supra note 90, at 106-08. In addition, payments to terminated franchisees under the state
laws result in wealth transfers from the franchisor to a few franchisees. See Brickley et
al., supra note 90, at 126-30.
198. Indeed, the franchisor will only hurt his future attempts to sell and renew
franchises by arbitrary terminations. See Epstein, supra note 196, at 315; Klein & Saft,
supra note 55, at 356; Lockerby, supra note 87, at 846, 859-60 (statutory requirements for
good cause and notice of termination are superfluous because any franchisor will take
such actions out of self-interest to avoid costs of replacing an experienced franchisee);
Pitegoff, supra note 87, at 310 (as practical matter few franchisees are terminated, and
franchisor has no incentive to terminate without cause); Smith, supra note 88, at 130
(supplier has no incentive to terminate or fail to renew dealer without cause). Rep. Andy
Ireland, an opponent of federal bills to regulate franchisees, dismisses the complaining
franchisee as a "whiny butt" who "couldn't hack it because he didn't have the skills."
Victor, supra note 92, at 2184.
199. See Epstein, supra note 196, at 314; Jordan, supra note 121, at 840; Pitegoff, supra
note 87, at 310. Suppliers will be forced to incur additional costs in documenting the
reasons for each action they take. The public will also have to bear the cost of inefficiency
due to over-deterrence and the cost of having the courts determine on a case-by-case basis
the fairness of each particular action. All of this is unnecessary, they argue, because each
supplier, acting in his own self interest, will inevitably act in accord with basic rules of
business ethics. Lockerby, supra note 87, at 845-48 (state and federal dealer statutes
provide little guidance as to when termination is lawful and therefore require costly case-
by-case adjudications which, in turn, cause greater monitoring and documentation costs).
One empirical study found that in industries characterized by nonrepeat customers, there
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However, the developments outlined in Parts II and III of this paper
indicate that any such attempt to limit dealer remedies is doomed to fail-
ure.2" Regardless of the logic of the economic theory regarding dealer
remedies (and some dispute its claims),2 01 the public has shown that it
wants the law to protect intrabrand competition and to guarantee dealers
a certain degree of fairness and independence. Indeed, there are three
ways to account for new dealer remedies. First, society may be indicat-
ing a willingness to sacrifice some economic efficiency in order to protect
dealers. This is not to say that society does not want the market effi-
ciency and supplier protection offered by current antitrust jurispru-
dence.20 2 Rather, society may simply value both economic and
noneconomic concerns and be willing to protect the latter, even at the
cost of higher consumer prices.20 3 Second, the new dealer remedies may
reflect the public's skepticism about basic, but ultimately unverifiable,
is less franchising in states with franchise laws, thereby lending support to the hypothesis
that franchise laws increase the franchisor's costs. However, in industries with predomi-
nantly repeat customers, the state laws did not affect the amount of franchising. Presum-
ably there is less free riding in the latter industries because each franchisee has an
incentive to maintain the high standards of the franchise name. Brickley et al., supra note
90, at 117-26.
200. Dealers who act in concert under the franchise acts can, of course, run afoul of
the Sherman Act if the dealers are found to have engaged in horizontal price fixing or
territorial or customer allocation. See ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547,
553-57 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1176 (1992); Robert W. Emerson,
Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 1503, 1549-55
(1990).
201. Some franchisees dispute the "popular perception" that only a small fraction of
franchisees fail. The true failure rate, they say, is not 5% but between 30-40%. See
Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, Dispute Grows Over True Rate of Franchisee Failures, Wall St. J.,
July 3, 1992, at B2. Furthermore, there is evidence that a franchisor can be financially
successful (through upfront payments from new franchisees) even if the franchisees ulti-
mately fail. See Barbara Marsh, Franchise Realities: Sandwich-Shop Chain Surges, but to
Run One Can Take Heroic Effort, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1992, at Al; Victor, supra note 92,
at 2186. There is also evidence that some franchisors try to limit the power of franchisees
by retaining ownership of the real estate for outlets or by limiting the number of outlets a
franchisee may own. See Suzanne Loeffelholz, Burger Wars: The Final Chapter, Fin.
World, May 16, 1989, at 26.
202. The emergence of various dealer remedies does not mean that society disagrees
with the supplier protection provided by current antitrust analysis. Obviously, because
common law reflects society's overall view of its own well-being, see infra note 212, the
case law developments in antitrust must be indicative of a societal desire to give suppliers
some leeway in making marketing decisions. The developments outside of antitrust, how-
ever, show that society has interests beyond those being protected by antitrust.
203. Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 1, 20-23 (1982) (while consumers want low prices and high quality goods, they
also have other "noneconomic" preferences which they consider wealth maximizing and
for which they are willing to pay; democratic political processes will generate policies
reflecting society's preferences); Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 241-42 (Chicago model is
based on irrational assumption that people do not value "noneconomic" goals as well as
low prices); Peritz, supra note 196, at 303-04 (Chicago School fails to recognize that
society may have noneconomic goals that it values with "political votes"); Pitofsky, supra
note 6, at 1052 (if law fails to take noneconomic concerns into account, it will be "out of
touch with the rough political consensus"). Some commentators argue that the law
should guarantee fairness for the franchisee. See supra note 133.
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tenets of the economic efficiency theory,2' and in particular, the claim
that being pro-manufacturer is also pro-consumer. s Society may, in ef-
fect, be voicing its belief that dealer fairness and intrabrand competition
are as vital to low prices and optimal product selection as the supplier
protection now guaranteed by antitrust." 6 Third, and most probable,
the new dealer remedies may reflect some combination of these two fac-
tors. In any of these cases, the remedies emerging outside of antitrust are
responding to concerns that the public wants considered but that current
antitrust analysis ignores. To say, as some economic efficiency advocates
do,2"7 that the public is wrong is no answer.208 The concerns expressed
by the public are valid and legitimate, not because they conform to some
economic theory, but because they reflect how society believes its well-
being will be maximized. 209
Some economic efficiency proponents offer a different explanation for
the emergence of the various dealer remedies, particularly, the state
204. A number of commentators have noted that one weakness of the economic effi-
ciency approach is that it is based on unprovable premises. Crespi, supra note 12, at 239-
42; Fox, supra note 6, at 1170; Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 234-37; Rowe, supra note 59,
at 1550. For a discussion of whether the law should even assume that a firm seeks to
maximize its profits, see Kaplow, supra note 12, at 547-51 (a firm's managers may want
to maximize sales and growth rather than profits).
205. While Chicagoans claim that their theory is nonpolitical, some commentators
contend that, in fact, it is based on normative judgments and has a very strong pro-
business political bias that works to the benefit of the rich. Crespi, supra note 12, at 243-
44; Fox, supra note 6, at 1155-56; Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 232; Peritz, supra note
196, at 305, 311. The recent statements of the consumer groups show that consumers
agree with the critics of the Chicago approach. See supra notes 157-162 and accompany-
ing text.
206. See supra note 8. In other words, consumers might agree with the position that
dealer protection and intrabrand competition are relevant economic concerns. In doing
so consumers are not necessarily rejecting the entire Chicago theory; they may simply be
saying that both interbrand and intrabrand competition and both supplier and dealer
protection are necessary for true economic efficiency. See Piraino, supra note 8, at 298-99
(intrabrand competition benefits the consumer by lowering prices, encouraging efficient
and innovative retailing and, in some cases, spurring interbrand competition). See also
supra note 202.
207. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
208. Ironically, the economic efficiency advocates, on the one hand, argue that the
common law developments in antitrust reflect new learning about consumer welfare but,
on the other hand, contend that statutory and common law developments outside of anti-
trust are wrongheaded. See supra notes 21, & 192-193 and accompanying text.
209. Indeed, a principal economic efficiency proponent, Richard Posner, adopts the
premise that "the common law seeks to promote efficiency in the sense of wealth max-
imization." Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation
of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 185 (1986) [hereinafter
Posner, Legal Formalism]. If this is true, then the common law developments outside of
antitrust law reflect a view that dealer protection and preservation of intrabrand competi-
tion are necessary for society's wealth maximization. Posner also admits that the eco-
nomic efficiency theory works well only where there is "at least moderate agreement"
that economic efficiency is the end to be sought. Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragma-
tism To Offer?, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1653, 1668 (1990) [hereinafter Posner, What Has Prag-
matism]. The emerging dealer remedies, however, indicate that economic efficiency, as
defined by the Chicago School, is not the only "end" that society is seeking.
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franchise laws.21' They contend that these laws reflect nothing more
than strong lobbying by dealer associations coupled with consumer igno-
rance and irrational sentimentality about small businesses. 21' One flaw
in this theory, however, is that it does not account for the increasing
protections for dealers in the common law, which even economic effi-
ciency proponents concede tends to reflect basic societal values.212
Moreover, to the extent the argument addresses state statutes, it faces the
problem there are substantially more consumers, equipped with their
own lobbies, than dealers in the electorate. 13 Lobbies for dealers might
210. The problem these commentators face is explaining why state legislatures have
passed franchisee-protection laws that, according to the economic efficiency theory, harm
consumers.
211. See, e.g., Brickley et al., supra note 90, at 115 (the laws were the result of political
pressure from former and some existing franchisees and some dealer and franchisee as-
sociations); Caffey, supra note 102, at 1343 (the bills "tend to be presented to legislators
and perceived in very emotional terms-vulnerable small business versus overpowering
big business"); Smith, supra note 88, at 154 (attributing the laws to consumer ignorance,
dealer power, and the ability of suppliers to pass the added costs on to consumers). These
explanations are consistent with the general theory of legislation espoused by some eco-
nomic efficiency advocates: that legislation often reflects interest-group lobbying rather
than the general public interest. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 15-16 (1984); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875,
877 (1975). For a summary of this theory of legislation, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 875-83 (1987).
212. Many jurisprudence scholars have noted that the common law and judicial inter-
pretations of statutes reflect the overall interests of society. See, e.g., Steven J. Burton,
An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 220, 223-24 (1985); Edward H. Levi, An
Introduction to Legal Reasoning 4 (1949); Roscoe Pound, 3 Jurisprudence 21 (1959);
Max Riimelin, Developments in Legal Theory And Teaching During My Lifetime, in The
Jurisprudence of Interests 1, 22-24 (1948); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1535-37 (1987). In accounting for the fact that
in molding the common law (and in interpreting statutes), judges reflect the general ethi-
cal principles and goals of society, Guido Calabresi states:
Judges are, after all, either elected or appointed and ratified by elected officials.
Their manner of selection suggests that they can both discern and respond to
the popular will .... In seeking to apply [a common law] framework to new
circumstances, each judge inevitably brings to the task some sense of the major-
ity that selected him or her and some sense of what is right for the country
Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 93, 97 (1982). Even Richard
Posner, a key proponent of the economic efficiency approach, recognizes that the com-
mon law reflects the current outlook of the populace. See Posner, What Has Pragmatism,
supra note 209, at 1667 ("As society changes, judges, within the broad limits set by the
legislators and by the makers of the Constitution, must adapt the law to its altered envi-
ronment."); Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 209, at 186 (Common law premises
"could be, and no doubt would be . . ., altered by the judges in response to changing
perceptions of public policy."). See also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adju-
dication As A Private Good, 8 J. Legal Stud. 235, 261 (1979) (common law is economically
efficient); see also supra note 209.
213. One theory of the economic efficiency school is that consumers are "too numerous
to organize an effective 'cartel' in support of or in opposition to existing or proposed
legislation." Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 497 (3d ed. 1986). The same
point is made in Easterbrook, supra note 211, at 15-16. Left unexplained are: (1) the
organized and forceful consumer lobbies speaking out against vertical restraints, and (2)
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be able to hoodwink consumers in one, two, or even five states.21 4 But to
say such lobbies duped consumers in seventeen states over a twenty-year
period strains credulity.215 The recent work of sophisticated groups like
Consumers Union, AARP, and Public Citizen's Congress Watch in favor
of federal bills which strengthen the positions of dealers shows that con-
sumer lobbies have not ignored this issue. 2 16 To the contrary, these
groups have considered and rejected the arguments of the economic effi-
ciency proponents. 217 Furthermore, the suggestion that the public in sev-
enteen states cannot protect itself flies in the face of a fundamental
premise of the economic approach: that the free market maximizes so-
cial welfare. As Herbert Hovenkamp points out, if the Chicago School
truly wants the free market to govern, then the market must also be per-
mitted to rule in the legislative arena.2
That society may have inconsistent desires-wanting both interbrand
and intrabrand competition and both supplier and dealer protection-is
also no reason to curtail the new dealer remedies.21 9 Many areas of law
involve an accommodation of conflicting societal goals."O In antitrust
why, when consumer lobbies do speak out, they should be ignored if they disagree with
economic efficiency theory. See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
214. Reports of the Iowa franchise legislation fight suggest that franchisors are well
equipped to battle any franchisee lobby. In Iowa the franchisors' association and its
members spent "well in the six figures... and are prepared to do that in every state."
Victor, supra note 92, at 2188.
215. See supra notes 89 and 92. Not surprisingly, some scholars argue that the eco-
nomic theorists have greatly exaggerated the importance of interest groups in the enact-
ment of legislation. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 211, at 886-90 (summarizing recent
political science literature and research); Eskridge, supra note 212, at 1515-16 (both his-
tory and political science scholarship indicate interest group theory is overstated).
216. See supra notes 151-156 and accompanying text. Furthermore, while Consumers
Union might be said to represent a special subset of consumers-those who are self-
educated about products and less likely to need dealer-provided services-the same
charge cannot be leveled at AARP, Citizen's Congress Watch, the National Council of
Senior Citizens or the many other consumer groups who have voiced concern about this
issue.
217. See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
218. Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 249, 255 (voters are entitled to have what they want
even if it is irrational and inconsistent; ironically, Chicagoans want a free market every-
where but in the legislature); Hovenkamp, supra note 203, at 17-22 (we cannot assume
that the free economic market is rational but the legislative market is irrational).
219. See Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 249, 255; Peritz, supra note 196, at 311-12 (dis-
cussing conflicting consumer goals in antitrust).
220. Indeed, a key purpose of a legal system is to resolve conflicts between competing
societal interests. See Philipp Heck, The Jurisprudence of Interests: An Outline, in The
Jurisprudence of Interests 29, 35 (M. Magdalena Schoch trans. & ed. 1948); Pound, supra
note 212, at 327-28. In many areas of law, the accommodation of competing interests is
handled within the same body of law. In civil procedure, for instance, the discovery rules
provide a balance between the desire for full disclosure to aid efficiency at trial and the
need to protect attorney work product. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). In abortion, the law
attempts to achieve a balance between the rights of the pregnant woman and the state's
interest in a viable fetus. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521
(1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-65 (1973). In criminal procedure, Fourth
Amendment law attempts to reconcile society's interest in detection, apprehension, and
conviction of guilty persons with the sometimes conflicting goals of fair procedures and
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law, the rise of the economic efficiency approach, while satisfying soci-
ety's desire to protect the supplier and interbrand competition,22' effec-
tively eliminated competing concerns by adjudging them to be without
value. Now the law is accommodating society's continued interest in
those concerns by expanding various areas outside of antitrust. 222
Moreover, the case law in these areas demonstrates the fears of over-
deterrence, large damage awards, and lack of manageability are not nec-
essarily applicable to the new dealer remedies.223 In handling cases
under these theories, courts have shown that accommodation of compet-
ing dealer and supplier interests is feasible 224 and that remedies can be
tailored to fit the case. Standards of "fairness" and "ethical" behavior
admittedly lack the mathematical precision cherished by some economic
efficiency advocates.225 However, anyone reading the case law quickly
discerns what factors are influential.226 Indeed, if, as the Chicagoans ar-
gue, the typical supplier will treat his dealers fairly out of self-interest, 221
then the lawsuits in these areas should not be a matter of concern to the
rational, profit-seeking supplier.228
respect for personal privacy. See I Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Proce-
dure § 1.6 (1984).
221. See supra note 202.
222. See Flynn, supra note 77, at 895 (state franchise laws can be seen as a response to
the lack of sensible federal regulation in antitrust or elsewhere). In particular, franchise
laws complement antitrust laws with regard to the time at which the dealer is protected.
The antitrust laws protect a dealer from horizontal price fixing by competing franchisors
in connection with the sale of franchises or dealerships. (Additionally, section 2 of the
Sherman Act may provide the dealer with some protection from a monopolist
franchisor.) The state franchise laws, on the other hand, protect the dealer during the
dealer relationship. On the issue of timing, see Braun, supra note 87, at 216 (franchise
laws reflect a recognition that franchise relationship is not simply a one-time sale but an
ongoing relationship); Philip F. Zeidman, Antitrust Law: Legal Problems in the Life Cy-
cle of a Franchise, 50 Antitrust L.J. 855, 857-58 (1981) (court should consider, in deter-
mining legality of franchisor's restraint, whether franchisee is new, mature, or failing
concern because franchisee's need for protection varies over time).
223. Some economic efficiency advocates contend that private antitrust suits have led
to an over-expansion of antitrust liability. See Posner, supra note 10, at 228; Block &
Sidak, supra note 56, at 1133-34; Page, supra note 76, at 1450-59.
224. See supra notes 111-1 18, 127-132, and 135-137 and accompanying text; see also
Gellhorn, supra note 120, at 520 (case-by-case determinations are necessary to review
dealer terminations); Pitofsky, supra note 6, at 1067 (economic efficiency advocates have
overstated the difficulty of introducing political values into antitrust).
225. For example, Frank Easterbrook, a proponent of the Chicago School approach,
advocates a filter system for any vertical restraint cases that are tried. Under this system,
the plaintiff would have to prove first that the defendant has market power. See Easter-
brook, supra note 52, at 19-23. Wesley Liebeler similarly suggests an initial inquiry in
any vertical case into the supplier's market power. See Liebeler, supra note 6, at 26-27;
see also Baxter, supra note 1, at 947-48 (vertical restraints should be presumed benign
unless structural analysis indicates supplier could use restraint to gain or exercise market
power).
226. See supra notes 111-137 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 198.
228. One commentator argues that a legal scheme based on ethical standards may bet-
ter serve society than abstract, economically based rules. See Shell, supra note 119, at
1244-47. Shell points out even economically based rules contain uncertainty, making
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Concerns for fairness and business ethics also become less frightening
when one remembers that these concerns are not unique to the various
dealer remedies outlined in this Article. Rather, these very same con-
cerns arise, inter alia, in the law of trade secrets,229 restrictive cove-
nants,23 ° tortious interference with contract,"1 and in the Federal Trade
Commission Act232 and the "little FTC acts" of various states .1 3 In
none of these areas have courts ignored societal demands for commercial
predictions risky. See id, If business deals take place within a system of ethical norms,
rules based on such norms should come as no surprise and may be better suited to resolv-
ing disputes than economically based rules. See id Moreover, flexible standards such as
"unfairness" discourage a supplier from trying to maneuver around the law; the sup-
plier's economic self-interest may not be sufficient to insure fairness toward dealers. See
id
229. See e.g., E.I. DuPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102
(1917); Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1201 (5th Cir. 1986);
Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982); E.I. DuPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400
U.S. 1024 (1971).
230. See eg., Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556,
560-61 (4th Cir. 1990), cert denied, I llS. Ct. 1414 (199 1); Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko
v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971, 976 (Miss. 1992); Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353
N.E.2d 590, 592-93 (N.Y. 1976). For an analysis of historical and current approaches to
restrictive employment covenants, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to
Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1960).
231. See, eg., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 767-68, 771 (1979); Nathanson v.
Medical College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1388-89 (3d Cir. 1991); Adler, Barish, Daniels,
Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1183-84 (Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
907 (1979); Pleas v. City of Seattle, 774 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Wash. 1989) (en banc). For a
history and detailed analysis of this tort, see Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Con-
tract and Other Economic Expectancies:. A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 61 (1982). The standards for tortious interference law and antitrust are
compared in Myers, supra note 193, at 1137-40.
232. See; eg., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 245 (1972) (FTC is
authorized to protect consumers as well as competitors); Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc.
v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1988) (setting forth "unfairness" standard
promulgated by FTC) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1041 (1989); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d
287, 293 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that the FTC is authorized to prohibit conduct that,
although legally proper, is unfair to consumers).
233. See, eg., Jays Foods, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc, 664 F. Supp. 364, 369-70 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (injury may arise from unfair rather than illegal acts), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1014
(1989); In re Globe Distrib., Inc., 129 B. R. 304, 320-21 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (double
damages for willful or knowing use of unfair practices); Doliner v. Brown, 489 N.E.2d
1036, 1039 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (remedy available for "unfair method[s] of competi-
tion"); see also Shell, supra note 119, at 1206-11 (modern commercial law shows in-
creased judicial reliance on ethical standards to resolve disputes). The standards used in
the state acts are discussed in Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Under the "Little FTC Acts": Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 Dick. L. Rev.
373 (1990); see also Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission
Jurisprudence, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 521, 531-46 (1980) (discussing standards of state
statutes protecting consumers from unfair trade practices); Jeff Sovern, Private Actions
Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Role Model. 52
Ohio St. L.J. 437, 446-52 (1991) (discussing the range of standards adopted in the "little
FTC acts" and the wisdom of affording consumers a private right of action).
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ethics simply because fairness is an imprecise concept. 3
Furthermore, even if state legislatures and courts could curtail the new
dealer remedies, there is a fundamental reason why they ought not em-
bark on such a course. These remedies provide a safety valve for soci-
ety's skepticism regarding the economic efficiency approach. Until
someone can prove that the economic efficiency theory in fact comports
with reality,235 there is the chance that in some (perhaps many) markets,
public perception is correct and suppliers are not protecting consumer
interests in imposing vertical restraints on dealers. Obviously, as long as
there is a possibility that real markets do not function in the way econo-
mists theorize, prudence dictates retaining an avenue of dealer and in-
trabrand protection as a way of protecting consumers.
B. The Future of Antitrust
Assuming that the statutory and judicial dealer remedies cannot and
should not be curtailed, the next inquiry is: What do these developments
imply for future antitrust jurisprudence? While a detailed plan for the
future of vertical restraints in antitrust law is beyond the scope of this
Article, some broad outlines are possible.
The growing public disbelief of the economic efficiency theory is a
clear sign that courts need to rethink their almost-total reliance on this
theory and its models in antitrust jurisprudence. To the extent society
views antitrust law as out of touch with the real world, the public's confi-
dence in and respect for the law will be lost.236 In particular, given the
outcry over vertical pricing restraints, the courts ought not remove the
per se bar to resale price maintenance. Instead, the judiciary should relax
the substantive and standing rules with respect to vertical price fixing.
237
With regard to tie-ins and vertical nonprice restraints, courts should con-
tinue with the approach taken in Eastman Kodak and demand, on a case-
by-case basis, a showing that theory matches reality.238
Congress, for its part, should go forward with legislation to remove the
limits placed on the per se rule for vertical pricing restraints by Monsanto
and Sharp.2 39 Consumers have indicated, in no uncertain terms, that
they want such legislation.
234. Louis Schwartz points out that concerns with "justice" and other noneconomic
values are also found in the antitrust laws that the United States insisted be adopted by
Germany and Japan following World War II and in the Robinson-Patman Act. See
Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1077-78.
235. See supra note 204.
236. As Robert Pitofsky points out, the law needs the consensus of society more than
the consensus of economists. See Pitofsky, supra note 6, at 1052 n.3.
237. At least one lower court has used the doctrine in the vertical area to deny dam-
ages to a discounting dealer whose damage claim assumed continued adherence to resale
price maintenance by other dealers. See Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur Inc., 787
F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (7th Cir. 1986).
238. See supra notes 177-88 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62
1993] VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
This approach, however, only answers the public's concerns about the
unreality of economic theory; there remains the complete disregard for
intrabrand competition and dealer protection in current antitrust analy-
sis.' In the past, some scholars argued for the inclusion of such con-
cerns on the basis of the legislative history of the antitrust laws.", Until
now, economic efficiency advocates discounted these historical argu-
ments on the theory that economic learning evolves and courts ought not
be shackled with outmoded, erroneous views.24 The developments out-
lined in this Article, however, demonstrate that society continues to
value fairness and intrabrand competition and that these concerns cannot
be dismissed as dusty artifacts of history. To retain the public's support,
the law cannot totally exclude these issues as antitrust analysis currently
does.243
The emerging dealer remedies indicate that the real question is not
whether to take these concerns into account but where. At present these
concerns are being handled by a patchwork of state2, (and a few fed-
eral)245 remedies. Bringing these issues back into the antitrust fold
would certainly make messy what is an increasingly tidy area of law.246
On the other hand, it would have the advantage of providing more uni-
form, predictable treatment for dealers and suppliers.247 Furthermore,
the tidiness in current antitrust jurisprudence is largely offset by the de-
tailed, case-by-case adjudications occurring in areas outside of antitrust.
240. For example, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2072, 2092 (1992), the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's denial of defendant's
summary judgement motion. The Court stated that a question of fact existed as to
whether defendant's conduct lessened competition in the tied service market. See id. at
2084-89. There was no suggestion that the trier of fact should consider trader freedom
issues in resolving the case.
241. See Fox, supra note 6, at 1147-50; Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act, supra note 8, at
1021-30; Lande, supra note 7, at 86-106; James May, The Role of the States in the First
Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture ofAntitrust History, 59 Antitrust LJ.
93, 95-105 (1990); Pitofsky, supra note 6, at 1060-65; Rowe, supra note 59, at 1513-24.
242. In justifying its decision in Sharp, the Supreme Court relied, in part, on the need
to interpret a "dynamic" Sherman Act in light of "new circumstances and new wisdom."
Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988). The same point had been made
by proponents of the economic efficiency approach. Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 706;
Posner, supra note 5, at 282, 297.
243. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
244. See supra part II.
245. See supra notes 88 and 106.
246. One commentator argues that because of the special nature of the franchise rela-
tionship, the antitrust laws are ill-suited to resolving franchise disputes. See Braun, supra
note 87, at 202-16. Similarly, Phillip Areeda suggests that absent a showing of anticom-
petitive effect (by which he seems to mean effect in the horizontal interbrand market),
coercion and dealer fairness issues are better handled through the state franchise statutes
and common law remedies rather than the antitrust laws. See 8 Areeda, supra note 45, I
1609, at 139-42.
247. See Flynn, supra note 77, at 895 (suggesting the need for a federal, uniform ap-
proach to franchise issues rather than patchwork of state remedies); Gellhorn, supra note
120, at 472 (the law needs a rational, uniform approach to dealer terminations rather
than an ad hoc approach).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62
Given this, antitrust jurisprudence should opt for completeness over tidi-
ness. This does not mean a return to the cases in which coercion of a
dealer was almost equated with violation of the antitrust laws.248 In-
stead, it means, for any vertical restraints that are not per se illegal, 249 a
return to a fuller rule-of-reason analysis that includes consideration of
intrabrand competition and fairness issues-fairness to both the dealer
and the supplier.25 0 These issues can be considered as part of the overall
reasonableness of the restraint,251 as a tie-breaker where the interbrand
effects of the restraint are unclear, 252 or as a means of shifting the burden
to the supplier to justify the restraint by showing it will actually lead to
lower prices or a better product mix. 253 Exactly how these factors are
considered is not as important as that they be considered. Until they are,
antitrust jurisprudence will continue to be incomplete and unconnected
with the real world in the eyes of the public.
CONCLUSION
The economic efficiency theory of vertical restraints has many advan-
tages: it is logical, consistent, and simple. By using this theory, courts
have a ready justification for not getting involved in complicated distri-
bution arrangements: if a vertical arrangement were inefficient, the mar-
ket would produce a change. Furthermore, a judge is assured that in
248. Phillip Areeda notes that in the years following Colgate, many lower courts came
to view coercion "as a substitute for express agreement. Indeed, many lower courts came
routinely to hold that unwilling compliance with another's demands in order to avoid
termination creates an agreement." 7 Areeda, supra note 45, 1 1451a, at 120. Having
found an agreement based on coercion, the court had only to find some specification of a
resale price to conclude there was per se illegal price fixing. See, e.g., Yentsch v. Texaco,
Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 51-55 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that jury could reasonably find an illegal
combination to fix prices where an oil company threatened to terminate service station
dealers to enforce pricing policy); Green v. General Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 648-56
(5th Cir. 1975) (prohibiting RPM where independent firms, otherwise in competition, sell
a product with wide spread consumer demand), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976).
249. As indicated earlier, I advocate keeping the per se illegal bar to vertical price
fixing and removing the limits placed on that bar by Monsanto and Sharp.
250. Some Chicagoans question whether a judge or jury is capable of performing a rule
of reason analysis, Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 11 ("it is fantastic to suppose that
judges and juries could make such an evaluation"; a formula that makes everything rela-
tive makes nothing dispositive, so it is impossible to know what factor might outweigh
another); Gerhart, supra note 74, at 438-39 ("the rule-of-reason standard generally ap-
plied gives the jury wide discretion to arrive at its own assessment of competitive ef-
fects"); Posner, supra note 1, at 15 ("vagueness" of rule of reason standard is problem
with juries consisting of laymen). However the case law under the various dealer reme-
dies shows that judges and juries are indeed capable of balancing competing concerns.
251. This is the position advocated by Eleanor Fox, supra note 6, at 1182-83 and John
Flynn, supra note 1, at 1146-47.
252. Pitofsky, supra note 6, at 1074-75, suggests the tie-breaker approach.
253. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1076, recommends using noneconomic concerns to
shift the burden to the supplier to justify the restraint. See Flynn, supra note 1, at 1144-
46, suggests treating some vertical restraints as presumptively illegal and placing the bur-
den on the supplier to rebut the presumption.
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protecting suppliers, she is not being pro-business; she is being pro-
consumer.
In the past there has been a lively theoretical debate among antitrust
scholars about the validity of the economic approach. The time has now
come to move away from theory and consider the real world and societal
needs. The recent developments outlined in this Article indicate that,
regardless of whether it is theoretically correct, the economic efficiency
approach suffers from two serious, and ultimately fatal, flaws: it is in-
complete in the sense of failing to respond to key societal concerns, and
consumers view it as out of sync with reality.
The state franchise acts and evolving common law doctrines show that
society continues to value dealer fairness and wants it protected by law.
Like much in life, law is at heart a sponge. Although the economic effi-
ciency theory banished fairness issues from antitrust, because these same
issues do have public support, they have popped out and received atten-
tion elsewhere. Moreover, the new statutory and common law develop-
ments are as valid and reflective of societal goals as antitrust
jurisprudence. Here, as in so many places, society simply has conflicting
and competing needs.
Furthermore, the recent public outcry over vertical restraints provides
vivid evidence of a deep-seated and widespread disbelief about funda-
mental precepts of the economic model. The people who are questioning
the reality of the economic efficiency approach are not just a few crack-
pots. They are sophisticated consumer-protection organizations and
writers for well-established popular press newspapers. They may, of
course, be wrong. But so too the economic theorists may be wrong-not
necessarily about the theory but about its application to the real world.
In light of these dual developments, reliance on economic models in
antitrust vertical restraint law needs to be tempered. Specifically, the per
se rule for vertical pricing restraints should be retained. Additionally,
Congress should go forward with legislation to remove the limits placed
on the per se rule by Monsanto and Sharp. Tie-ins and nonprice vertical
restraints should be subjected to a fuller rule-of-reason analysis that in-
cludes consideration of intrabrand competition and dealer fairness. In
short, the time has come to move away from theory and into the real
world and consider what goals society wants protected and how consum-
ers regard their self interest as best served. No matter how logical or
simplifying the economic theory is, the law cannot retain public confi-
dence if it ignores society's concerns and perception of marketplace
realities.
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